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Abstract 
Although few economists today dismiss the use of the laboratory experiments, it would be a mistake to 
think that experimental methodology no longer represents a controversial issue in economics. One of 
the major criticisms is represented by the external validity of experimental data and concerns the 
transferability of results obtained in laboratory to the real world. The aim of this thesis is to tackle the 
issue of external validity focusing in particular on one aspect: the possible lack of representativeness of 
standard subjects pools usually used in economic research. The first experimental study compares the 
choices of undergraduates and subjects representative of population in different treatments and with 
different reward dimensions by exploiting the experimental design used by Pelligra and Stanca (2013) 
to investigate social preferences in a field experiment. Our results show that two samples follow a 
common behavioral pattern with the only exception of a significant difference in choices where self-
interest may play a prominent role. In the second study we use a between-subjects design to compare 
the behavior of experienced and inexperienced subjects. We investigate whether the laboratory 
experience, built through repeated participation in experimental sessions, biases subjects’ behavior in a 
set of representative simple games used to study social preferences. Our main finding shows how 
subjects having a high level of experience in lab experiments do not behave in a significantly different 
way from novices. 
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Summary  
 
“An honest skeptic then has the burden of stating what is different about the outside world that might 
change results obtained in the laboratory”  
(Friedman and Sunder, 1994) 
 
The parallelism or external validity represents the most important methodological issue related 
to experimental economics and concerns the transferability of experimental results obtained in 
laboratory to the real world. Smith defines parallelism as: “propositions about the behaviour of 
individuals and the performance of institutions that have been tested in laboratory microeconomies 
apply also to non-laboratory microeconomies where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold defines a 
sufficient condition for the transferability of results from laboratory to field environments” (1982, p. 
936). Given limitations of econometrics and field experiments, able to interpret the data only in terms 
of assumptions about preferences and subjects’ behavior, the author describes the experimental 
methodology necessary to control these variables within a microeconomic system created in the lab and 
to observe and measure the message responses of agents and the outcomes resulting from these 
messages. However, despite Smith’s confidence in parallelism, skepticism about the external validity 
of laboratory data has represented an obstacle to the acceptance of experimental economics as a “true” 
scientific discipline. The aim of this thesis is to tackle the issue of external validity focusing in 
particular on one aspect: the possible lack of representativeness of standard subjects sample usually 
used in the laboratory. 
 
In the first Chapter, we survey the existing literature on all issues related to this topic. We make 
a critical review of principle papers dealing with the issues linked to the generalizability of 
experimental data obtained in the laboratory and concerning: the use of unrepresentative subjects’ 
samples, the artificiality of the laboratory tasks, the provision of inadequate incentives and, the lack of 
sufficient opportunities to learn by experience for participants.  
 
In the second Chapter, we investigate about the use of standard samples of college students in 
economic experiments.  
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The use of convenient pool of college students represents one of the most common criticisms related to 
the generalizability of laboratory data. Replicating in the lab a simple experiment originally run with a 
representative sample of the population, we show that, despite the differences between college students 
and subjects of the general population in terms of demographics, cognitive skills and personalities, the 
observed behavior of the two samples follows a common pattern in a set of binary dictator games 
focusing on several motives for altruistic behavior. We compare the choices of undergraduates and 
subjects representative of population in different treatments and with different reward dimensions by 
exploiting the experimental design used by Pelligra and Stanca (2013) to investigate social preferences 
in a field experiment. Our results show that two samples follow a common behavioral pattern with the 
only exception of a significant difference in choices where self-interest may play a prominent role. This 
gap seems to be related mainly to the academic background of the participants: our sample of 
undergraduates economics students differ in their degree of self-interested choices both from the 
representative group of the population and from its sub-sample of students. 
 
In the third Chapter, we focus on another possible problem related to the representativeness of 
subjects usually considered in the experimental economic studies.  
The ever-increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centres in university 
campuses produced a peculiar category of participants: students with high level of laboratory 
experience built through repeated participation in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the 
experience accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behavior in a set of representative simple games 
used to study social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game). Our main finding shows how subjects having a high level of experience in lab 
experiments do not behave in a significantly different way from novices. 
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Chapter 1 
Parallelism: a Critical Review  
 
“In less than three decades economics has been transformed from a 
discipline where laboratory experimentation was considered 
impossible, useless, or at any rate largely irrelevant, into a science 
where some of the most exciting discoveries and developments are 
driven by experimental data.” 
(Guala 2008, p.2). 
 
 “Ironically most objections raise questions that can be very 
well analysed with lab experiments, suggesting the wisdom of 
conducting more lab experiments, not fewer”  
(Falk and Heckman 2009, p.537). 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Although few economists today dismiss the use of the laboratory experiments, it would be a 
mistake to think that experimental methodology no longer represents a controversial issue in 
economics. One of the major criticisms is represented by the external validity of experimental data and 
concerns the transferability of results obtained in laboratory to the real world. 
 The aim of this chapter is to make a critical review of some very influential studies dealing with 
the main issues linked to the generalizability of experimental data obtained in the laboratory.  
 I shall discuss how experimentalists usually respond to the basic criticism that experiments do 
not say much about the ‘real world’, and more specifically about the use of unrepresentative subject 
pools and artificial tasks, the provision of inadequate incentives and the lack of sufficient opportunity 
to learn by experience. 
 Section 1.2 focuses on the main steps that led to the introduction of experimental method in 
economics. Section 1.3 presents the general problem of external validity. Sections from 1.4 to 1.7 
discuss the most prominent problems related to the lack of generalizability of lab findings and 
specifically:  
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a) the unrepresentativeness of subject pool; 
b) the artificiality of the laboratory tasks; 
c) the inadequateness of incentives; 
d) the lack of sufficient opportunities to learn by experience, 
Section 8 sums up and concludes.  
 
1.2 Experimental and Non-experimental methodology in Economics 
During the twentieth century, many social science scholars were unanimous in considering 
economics as a theoretical science and experimental methodology as impractical in this field: economic 
research had to be carried out far from laboratories, whilst the experimental methodology was 
considered of exclusive domain of hard sciences.  
Skepticism about use of experimental method in economics represented an obstacle to the 
acceptance of experimental economics as a “true” scientific discipline inasmuch as most scholars did 
believe (and some still do), that lab experiments could not provide very meaningful data for the 
economic issues (Starmer, 2006). There is no wonder that the first lab experiments in economics were 
run only in the late 1940s and that fewer than 10 experimental papers were published before 1965 (Falk 
and Heckman, 2009).  
All the great scientists, from Galileo onwards, took care of defining how experiments had to be 
performed in the laboratory. Hard scientists, having as main aims of their research, description and 
prediction of phenomena, cannot disregard from the use of controlled experiments for their studies; lab 
experiments have the advantage of succeeding to control conditions more than in any other context. 
Social sciences, such as physical sciences, need to test their hypotheses and theories. 
The first discussions about the use of experimental method in economics were characterized by 
a clear distinction between hard and social sciences. According to J. S. Mill: “The physical sciences are 
those which treat of the laws of matter, and of all complex phenomena in so far as dependent upon the 
laws of matter. The mental or moral sciences are those which treat of the laws of mind, and of all 
complex phenomena in so far as dependent upon the laws of mind” (1844, p. 317).  
For the economist and philosopher, the laws of mind and laws of matter, cannot share the same 
routine analysis and method, and mostly, if on one hand the laws of matter are clearly unsuitable to 
guide social sciences, on the other hand, the same economic science really does not need it, taking 
advantage from ‘introspection’ (Guala, 2006) for understanding of own phenomena. Until that moment, 
both hard and social scientists did agree that “less harm is likely to be done by emphasising the 
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differences between the social and the natural sciences than by emphasising their similarities” (Robbins 
1932, p. 112). 
So, for all the XX century, economists of main Economic Schools, theoretically also conflicting 
from each other, have shared Mill’s and Robbins’ thought, by banishing any possible openness towards 
the experimental method. A pessimistic view about application of experimental method on social 
science was also expressed by Milton Friedman, one of the most influential economists of the second 
half of the 20th century. According to the author “unfortunately, we can seldom test particular 
predictions in the social sciences by experiments explicitly designed to eliminate what are judged to be 
the most important disturbing influences [….]. The inability to conduct so-called ‘controlled 
experiments’ does not, in my view, reflect a basic difference between the social and physical sciences 
both because it is not peculiar to the social sciences - witness astronomy - and because the distinction 
between a controlled experiment and uncontrolled experience is at best one of degree. No experiment 
can be completely controlled, and every experience is partly controlled, in the sense that some 
disturbing influences are relatively constant in the course of it” (1953, p. 101).  
Lipsey perfectly sums up the mistrust about experimental method shared by previous 
academics: “it is rarely, if ever, possible to conduct controlled experiments with the economy. Thus 
economics must be a non-laboratory science” (1979, p. 39).  
All these statements clearly highlight how the experimental methodology in economics is been deeply 
influenced by the way in which the same discipline was considered by the scientific community. 
Initially, the necessity to fill the gap between the world of the abstracted theory and the data 
gathered in the real world was solved by incorporating some additional stochastic variables (Hey, 
1991). In that way the theory becomes “a combination of the original economic theory and some 
assumptions about the nature of the additional stochastic variables; so, if ‘the theory’ survives the test, 
it could be because both the original economic theory and the assumptions about the stochastic 
variables are correct, or because both the original economic theory and the assumptions about the 
stochastic variables are incorrect” (Hey 1991, p. 8), in both cases the inference is inherently 
ambiguous. 
Even though it is possible to identify some experimental or proto-experimental economic works 
since 1930, only in the 1990, Charles Plott, one of the pioneer of experimental economics, during the 
61° annual meeting of the Southern Economic Association, posed the question about the use of 
experimental method in economics and positive about the answer wrote: “Economics is one of the few 
sciences that is fortunate to have both the field and the laboratory with which to work. [..] The 
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laboratory methodology, which has historically been absent, will grow and become an important 
partner in a joint effort to isolate the principles which govern economic behavior” (1991, p. 918).  
The experimental economists generally pinpoint as first step towards the introduction of the 
experimental methodology in economics, the conference held in Santa Monica in 1952, but the lack of 
continuity in the research has made difficult the identification, for a long time, of a unified academic 
program. The 80s have seen a huge growth in the use of experimental method in economics but from 
an epistemological point of view, the Nobel Prize for Economic Science in 2002 to Vernon L. Smith 
has represented the true breakthrough point in the acknowledgement of economics as experimental 
discipline to all intents and purposes.  
The economic science was protagonist of one of the greatest revolution from one 
methodological point of view. As highlighted in the presentation speech delivered by the Norwegian 
Committee during the awarding of the Nobel for the Economics in 2002: “Until recently, economics 
was widely regarded as a non-experimental science that had to rely on observation of real-world 
economies rather than controlled laboratory experiments. [….] Moreover, today’s research increasingly 
relies on new data from laboratory experiments rather than on more traditional field data, that is, data 
obtained from observations of real economies” (Nobel Press, 2002:1). 
 
1.3 The external validity problem. What is it that makes the experimental lab 
different from the real world? 
The acceptance of the economics as experimental science, however, it has not been an obstacle-
free process. Many critics have spoken out against the use of experiments adducing several reasons 
related to the lack of external validity of laboratory findings. 
The parallelism or external validity is one of the most important methodological issues related 
to experimental economics and concerns the “ability to generalize from the research context to the 
settings that the research is intended to approximate” (Loewenstein, 1999: F26). Although, according to 
the author this methodological issue represents the ‘Achilles Heel’ of experimental economists, the 
majority “believe that in the certain features of their experiments, such as the incorporation of market 
institutions, the stationary replication, and carefully controlled incentives, make their experiments 
immune to the problem of external validity […]” (ibidem). 
Among them we can include the father of Experimental Economics, V. L. Smith, who defines 
parallelism as: “propositions about the behaviour of individuals and the performance of institutions that 
have been tested in laboratory microeconomies apply also to non-laboratory microeconomies where 
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similar ceteris paribus conditions hold defines a sufficient condition for the transferability of results 
from laboratory to field environments” (1982, p. 936).  
In agreement with Smith, since the abstractions of the laboratory are orders of magnitude 
smaller than those of economic theory, then it is possible to falsify any theory. If the aim of the 
experimentalist is to test hypotheses resulting from theory, then it is sufficient to respect four key 
precepts – non-satiation, saliency, dominance and privacy – to guarantee the generalizability of lab 
data. Inside the laboratory, saliency and non-satiation conditions will ensure the existence of 
microeconomies like ‘real live economic systems’, while, dominance and privacy conditions will 
permit to perform a working controlled laboratory experiment.  
Respecting these precepts, relevant to the internal validity
1
, experimentalists will be able to 
explore lab microeconomies in which real agents give-and-take messages through real institutions. It 
means that, similar conditions (ceteris paribus) which correspond to well-defined assumptions in lab 
and non-lab microeconomies, represent a sufficient requirement to draw valid inference from 
laboratory experiments, thus, as Smith points out, generalizing Shapley’s parallelism definition, “as far 
as we can tell, the same physical laws prevail everywhere
2
 (1964, p. 67).  
The limitations that we can find in the econometrics and in the field experiments, can be 
overcome with the experimental methodology: a microeconomic system created in the lab is able to 
observe and measure the message responses of agents and the outcomes from these messages (Smith, 
1982). However, despite Smith’s ‘confidence’ in parallelism, arguments against the generalizability of 
results obtained in laboratory continue to have strong resonance.  
As stressed by the Philosopher of Science Francesco Guala (2005), to write about the external 
validity is really challenging and so, whilst some experimentalists have intentionally avoided to address 
this methodological problem, other have proposed a set of rules able to guarantee a good 
generalizability of lab findings. But to face adequately the external validity issue, we need to consider 
the different purposes of experiments.  
Guala and Mittone (2005) have examined that aspect by considering the three main objectives 
of experimental research identified in the Roth’s taxonomy (1986): ‘Speaking to theorists’ which aim 
to test hypotheses from formally specified models and theories; ‘Searching for facts’ which aim to 
investigate phenomena or empirical regularities that cannot be explained by existing theoretical models 
and, ‘Whispering in the ears of princes’ which focus on illuminating or supporting policy-making 
process.  
                                                          
1 
 Internal validity refers to the ability to draw confident causal conclusions from one’s research (Loewenstein, 1999: F26). 
2
 Smith’s quote in Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science (1982). 
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As far as the first category, ‘Speaking to theorists’, is concerned, experiments can help to repel 
theories which do not succeed to survive in a simple experimental situation; a theory that cannot be 
completely specified, must be replaced. According to Plott: “General theories must apply to simple 
special cases. [….]. General models, such as those applied to the very complicated economies found in 
the wild, must apply to simple special cases. Models that do not apply to the simple special cases are 
not general and thus cannot be viewed as such” (1991, pp. 902-905). 
Concerning the second element in the taxonomy, ‘Whispering into the Ears of Princes’, specific 
target of research should be shaped in order to fit the experimental prototype in the laboratory. 
However the economists usually are not able to shape the world as they want, but they may follow the 
opposite strategy: by starting from the experimental system and designing it to resemble to the target as 
much as possible (Guala and Mittone, 2005).  
The last category identified by Roth, ‘Searching for Facts’, refers to experiments designed to 
collect data on interesting phenomena in the hope of identifying some pattern or empirical regularity. 
Even if from an ideal point of view all real phenomena should be explained through a theory, it may 
happen that these remain detached from any general principle. Several phenomena discovered in 
artificial environments are now widely discussed in the economic literature, such as violations of 
rationality.  
However, transferring a phenomenon to the real-world requires very detailed knowledge of the 
domain of application, so the generalizability, it is possible only up to a point. As suggested by Guala 
and Mittone “the relevance of results may be indirect, and it is unreasonable to impose the requirement 
that the experimental validity of each single experiment be proven rigorously. In many cases, 
experimenters contribute to the ‘library’ of phenomena that the applied scientist will borrow and 
exploit opportunistically on a case-by-case basis” (2005, p. 15). 
Moreover, the external validity of lab findings is strictly linked to the internal validity. The 
experimental validity of lab findings implicates a trade-off between two dimensions, internal and 
external: “The stronger an experimental design is with respect to one validity issue, the weaker it is 
likely to be with respect to the other” (Guala 2005, p. 144). For instance, a greater artificiality of the 
laboratory environment facilitates the internal validity of results but at the same time, it negatively 
strikes the external validity. Experimentalists are thus called to make a choice between these two 
dimensions: the simpler the experimental environment, the easier it is to identify the cause(s) 
responsible for a given phenomenon or effect and at the same time it distances it from real-life world. 
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In addition to the artificiality of lab environment, there are other differences between 
experimental and real-life conditions which may lead to the lack of validity of findings. The general 
criticism for which experiments do not say much about the ‘real world’ can be addressed focusing on 
four specific critiques: 1. the use of unrepresentative subject pools; 2. the use of artificial tasks; 3. the 
provision of inadequate incentives; 4. the lack of opportunity to learn by experience.  
However, as stressed by Guala: “That an experimental and a real-world system should differ in 
some respects is just inevitable and rather uninteresting by itself; the interesting question is whether the 
differences are casually relevant” (2005, p. 157). 
Until now, one of the best ways to investigate about these differences was to consider, case by 
case, each single question, by comparing the results obtained both in the laboratory and in the field 
performing the same experimental protocol. 
 
1.4 Unrepresentativeness of subjects pools 
The most common criticism about the lack of generalizability of lab findings concerns the 
representativeness of subjects’ pools. 
Until now three potential biases were largely explored: the self-selection problem of participants, the 
use of college students and, the use of Educated people coming from Western Industrialized, Rich 
and Democratic world (WEIRD acronym). Moreover, a relatively new potential source of bias linked 
to the representativeness of subjects’ pool arises from the combined effect of ‘location’ and ‘number’: 
given the almost exclusive location of labs in university campuses and the ever-increasing number of 
experiments run in each of these labs, subjects tend to accumulate experience through repeated 
participation in multiple experiments. 
Usually subjects who participate to experiments are university students. The massive presence 
of this category in research centres is confirmed by an analysis made on sixty papers published between 
2001 and 2002 in the major journals of experimental economics
3
: 54 of 60 papers published had as 
protagonists university students (Danielson and Holm, 2007). This category certainly differs from other 
samples of population for demographics
4
 
5
, such as age, experience, status, social class and it diverges 
                                                          
3
 Experimental Economics, Games and Economic Behaviour and Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 
4
 Guillén and Veszteg (2006), by analysing 8,755 observations coming from a laboratory (597 experimental sessions, 74 
incentive based economic experiments recorded over more than 2 years), find out that demographic differences can explain 
only 4% of the variations on dependent variable considered (payments received). Carbone (2005) analyses demographic 
characteristics in relation with subjects’ strategic behavior. She uses a unique experimental subject pool that participated in 
a life-cycle consumption experiment and finds that demographics have no effect on observed behavior. 
5
 See Calder et al., 1981; Greenberg, 1987; Kraus, 1995. 
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for cognitive skills and they tend to be more homogeneous. Undergraduates show “unfinished” 
personalities (Carlson, 1971), less-crystallized attitudes and less-formulated senses of self, more 
unstable peer group relationships, stronger tendencies to comply with authority and stronger cognitive 
skills than to older adults (Sears, 1986).  
In his second-order meta-analysis, Peterson (2001) has observed that students’ answers were 
slightly more homogeneous than those of non-students, and the effect sizes differed for direction and 
magnitude with respect to those of non-students. Considering that, as stated by Schultz: “[…] 
approximately 80% of our research is performed on the 3% of the population currently enrolled in 
college” (1969, p. 218), a deep reflection is pretty necessary. 
Moreover, “punctual college sophomore” volunteers are usually interested in research, quite 
willing to collaborate with the experimenter and in pursuit of social approval (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 
1969). For the volunteer subject, it is important to feel himself as a “good subject”: participant will be 
concerned about what their choices tell about them and, he/she could be tempted to validate the 
experimental hypothesis (Orne, 1969).  
Rosenthal and Rosnow (1997) have identified and ranked 17 characteristics of volunteers. 
According to their ranking, volunteers tend to be: better educated and more intelligent, belonging to 
higher social class, more social approval-seeking and more sociable than non-volunteers; moreover, 
they have a tendency to be more arousal-seeking, unconventional, females, non-authoritarians, Jewish 
or Protestant and nonconforming and finally, they are likely to come from smaller towns, interested in 
religion, altruistic, self-disclosing, maladjusted, and younger with respect to non-volunteers.  
All these elements can determine the first two potential biases in the experimental results 
related, first, to the unrepresentativeness of students with respect to the general population and, 
secondly, to the problem of self-selection. Even though the element of voluntariness needs to be clearly 
extended to all categories of subjects involved in research, there is a strong tie-up with figure of student 
and, for that reason self-selection and representativeness of subjects have been often addressed 
empirically together.  
 
1.4.1 The self-selection problem of participants 
Eckel and Grossman (2000), have examined the effect of recruitment method on behavior in a 
dictator game experiment, comparing results obtained with volunteers and pseudo volunteers in class 
(subjects recruited on the spot) and they find significant differences in the behavior between two 
samples. Their data show that pseudo volunteers are more generous on average than their volunteer 
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counterparts, and that non-monetary factors such as religion or altruistic preferences have a greater 
effect on the giving behavior of pseudo volunteers.  
A different procedure to evaluate the selection bias issue was implemented by Cleave et al. 
(2010); authors conducted a classroom experiment with a population of 1,173 students, using a trust 
game and a lottery choice task to measure individual preferences. In a second time, all 1,173 students 
were invited to participate in a laboratory experiment. To calculate the extent and direction of selection 
bias, authors compared students’ choices who decided to participate also in the lab experiment with 
those who did not. Their results show that social and risk preferences of students participating in the 
laboratory experiment are not significantly different from those belonging to student population.  
The ‘self-selection problem’ has also been documented by Anderson et al. (2013); they examine 
how the social preferences measured in a laboratory experiment vary across three different samples of 
experimental subjects: undergraduate ‘self-selected’ students for the lab experiment; non-students 
sample recruited with similar procedure used for recruiting students; non-students sample recruited 
using a procedure that allowed very little self-selection. They find that self-selection does not distort 
the measuring of other-regarding preferences and the share of individuals exhibiting other-regarding 
concerns, is remarkably smaller among college students, even after controlling for observable 
differences in socio-demographic characteristics among subject pools. Their results also reject the more 
specific hypothesis that approval-seeking subjects are the ones most likely to self-select into 
experiments and they also show a large difference between self-selected college students and self-
selected adults: the students appear considerably less pro-social.  
Focusing on social preferences topic, Falk et al. (2013) have investigated whether laboratory 
experiments with student samples distort the importance of the same. In two different studies, authors 
have examined the problem of ‘self-selection’ and ‘students’ representativeness’. As far as it concerns 
the first one, by comparing the behavior of participating-students and non-participating students, they 
find out that with respect to their prosocial inclination, the former are not significantly different from 
non-participating-students.  
Also Exadaktylos et al. (2013) examined issues related to students in laboratory whom 
voluntarily choose to participate focusing their attention on social preferences. In their study they 
employed data from a survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample in five experimental 
decisions in three canonical games: dictator, ultimatum and trust games. Their results confirm that self-
selected students represent an appropriate subject pool for the study of social behavior.  
See Tables 1.1-1.2 for a summary of the experimental studies above cited.
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1.4.2 College students 
The concerns about the potential biases steaming from use of college students as standard 
sample in lab are fuelled by much evidence: really college students tend to behave differently with 
respect to non-students.  
Gordon et al. (1986) analyse thirty-two studies which see groups of students and groups formed 
by non-students run identical protocols. In twelve studies
6
, statistical tests of between-group differences 
show strong divergences between two samples; by contrast, authors find no big differences in the 
studies which do not employ statistical comparison. Authors suggest three ideas to improve external 
validity of lab findings: 1) using trained experimental subjects; 2) running clinical debriefings to reveal 
subjects’ perceptions, understandings, and meanings associated with the research situations (Adair, 
1984); 3) to employ subjects with demographic and interest profiles similar to the non-students to 
whom researchers wish to generalize. They conclude that the ‘gatekeepers’ of science should 
discourage the use of students unless they do not look like to the sample of interest. 
More recent experimental studies have shown systematic differences between the behavior of 
college students and others specific categories.  
Cooper et al. (1999) have compared the ‘standard’ experimental subject population (students) with an 
‘expert’ subject population (Chinese managers and white-collar workers in state enterprises) addressing 
several open questions about the development of the ratchet effect in centrally planned economies and, 
more generally, about the evolution of strategic play in games. Contrary to the authors’ expectations, 
students in their role as firms exhibit significantly higher initial levels of strategic play than older, more 
experienced managers; this surprising result appears due to the age and/or lower educational levels of 
older managers. 
The suspicious that professionals’ behavior may differ from non-professionals7’ due to training, 
regulation, etc. led to Haigh and List (2005) to use a specific pool of professional traders recruited from 
the Chicago Board of Trade to investigate about the ‘myopic loss aversion’; previous experimental 
studies
8
 suggested that undergraduate students’ behavior is consistent with this “myopic loss aversion” 
conjecture. Unexpectedly, authors find that professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion to a 
greater extent than undergraduate students. 
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 Allen and Muchinsky (1984); Christensen-Szalanski et al. (1983); Churchill and Cooper (1971); Cornelius et al. (1984); 
Fleming (1969); Hakel et al. (1970a); Hakel et al. (1970b); Jago and Vroom (1982); Kavanagh (1975); Moskowitz (1971); 
Schneider (1982); Stow and Ross (1980). 
7
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8
 Thaler et al. (1997) and Gneezy and Potters (1997) have verified the existence of myopic loss aversion among 
undergraduate students. 
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A relevant finding about the difference between professionals and non-professionals (read 
students) is presented in an important work realized by Fehr and List (2004). They investigate 
experimentally how CEOs respond to incentives and how they provide the same in situations requiring 
trust and trustworthiness and, by comparing their behavior with the behavior of students, find that 
former are more trusting and show more trustworthiness than students. Moreover, most CEOs and 
students use the punishment threat, even though CEOs less.  
In a social framing study, Carpenter et al. (2005) compare experiments conducted with the 
standard social framing, that is, undergraduates at small liberal arts college in Vermont (Middelbury 
College) and students of a junior college in Kansas City, to field experiments using Kansas City 
workers. They find that proposers in the Ultimatum Game in the two experiments in Kansas City make 
more generous offers than students at the Middlebury College, even controlling for demographic 
differences (it confirms the regional differences hypothesis); moreover their results show that Kansas 
City students offer significantly more than both Kansas City workers and Middlebury college students, 
respectively, whilst in the Dictator Game, are the workers the more generous among all samples. 
Furthermore, they find that both samples of students show a drop in the average allocations between 
two games, while the workers offer the same amount, on mean, in both games. 
Bellemare and Kröger (2007) instead, explore behavior observed in an investment game 
between a representative sample of Dutch population and students’ pool in the laboratory. Lab 
participants provide a lower bound on the levels of investments and of amounts returned with respect to 
the level estimated in the representative sample. Their results indicate that trust, trustworthiness and 
other social preferences, once identified in the lab, are likely to be present, with greater intensity, in the 
population as a whole. 
Carpenter et al. (2008) run a Dictator Game in which students and random members of the 
community have to choose which charity to support and how much to donate. There are systematic 
differences between the choices of two groups: community members choose their own charity and 
donate significantly more (32% of them give the entire endowment). They conclude that students’ 
sample does not appear representative in the specific context of the charitable giving and the Dictator 
Game.  
Considering a wide set of standard experimental games (Dictator Game, Trust Game, Public 
Good Game, Beauty Contest and Second-price Auction), Belot et al. (2010) find out that, in general, 
students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than non-students in games involving 
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other-regarding preferences, while there is not a significant difference between samples in the games 
that do not engage them (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction).  
Falk et al. (2010) in their second study, compare behavior of students and the general 
population using the same experimental protocol (variant of a trust game); their results show that first 
movers display a similar behavioral pattern, whilst, in terms of reciprocation (second movers player) 
higher investments are reciprocated with high repayments in both groups, but the level of reciprocation 
is lower for students than for non-students.  
Cappelen et al. (2015) address the question whether lab experiments on student populations are 
useful to identify the motivational forces present in society at large by comparing the behavior of a 
nationally representative population with different student populations into the lab. Their results show 
that students may not be informative of the role of social preferences in the broader population: 
representative participants differ fundamentally from students both in their level of selfishness and in 
the relative importance assigned to different moral motives. 
See Tables 1.3-1.5  for a summary of the experimental studies above cited.
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1.4.3 The WEIRD people 
Henrich et al. (2010) have extensively explored the third possible source of lack of 
representativeness of samples. Specifically, authors wonder to what extent it is correct to assume a 
species-level generality of research findings considering that experimental samples usually come from 
western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic societies (named with WEIRD acronym in their 
work). From an analysis carried out by Arnett (2008) between years 2003 and 2007 on six 
psychological sub-disciplines, is came to light that 68% of participants come from USA and the 96% 
from Western industrialized countries, particularly from North America, Europe, Australia and Israel, 
that represent only 12% of the world population.  
The authors try to answer the important question whether the researchers are justified in 
assuming a species-level generality for their findings that regard, almost exclusively Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) people. They present a meta-analysis 
involving large-scale comparative experimentation on important psychological or behavioral variables 
and discuss four main contrasts: 1) differences between populations drawn from industrialized and 
small-scale societies in some basic psychological domains (visual perception, fairness and cooperation 
in economic decision-making, folkbiological reasoning, spatial cognition and potential differences); 2) 
Western with non-Western populations about four of the most studied domains (social decision 
making: fairness, cooperation, and punishment), independent versus interdependent self-concepts (and 
associated motivations), analytic versus holistic reasoning, and moral reasoning; 3) contemporary 
American versus the rest of the west population about individualism and related psychological 
phenomena; 4) typical contemporary American subjects versus other Americans (considering education 
for comparisons among contemporary adult Americans; spatial reasoning for comparisons 
subpopulations of American children; and psychological aspects for comparison between contemporary 
Americans and previous generations). 
Their meta-analysis shows that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are 
among the least representative populations one can find for generalizing about humans. Many of these 
findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and 
behavior – hence, there are no findings a priori for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is 
universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation.  
Overall, all these comparative measures describe industrialized populations as outliers, and 
among them, Westerners appear far from “standard subjects” for several key dimensions, such as 
allocentric spatial reasoning and antisocial punishment. Moreover, among Westerners, Americans 
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diverge for psychological or behavioral measures. As stressed by Henrich et al. (2005), people are 
endowed with cultural learning capacities that allow them to acquire beliefs and preferences 
appropriate for the local social environment. As consequence of adaptive learning processes, different 
societies will tend to arrive at different social equilibria and will express differently preferences and 
beliefs; each person will lead in lab her/his preferences and beliefs acquired into decision-making 
situations in the real world. See Table 1.6 for a summary of the study above cited. 
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1.4.4 Highly experienced subjects 
The last and new concern linked to the unrepresentativeness of subjects usually recruited in 
research labs concerns the role of experience in experiments. Indeed, having a long history of 
participations in experimental sessions might alter subjects’ behavior. The experience, built taking part 
repeatedly in experiments, could affect in some way, subjects’ choice in lab.  
This problem in economic experiments has been essentially neglected, with few notable 
exceptions: Benson and Faminov (1988) and Harrison et al. (1989) discussing IO experiments, Marwell 
and Ames (1980), Isaac et al. (1984) and Bolton (1991) in bargaining games experiments and more 
recently, Matthey and Regner (2013), Conte et al. (2014), Capraro and Cococcioni (2015) and Xue et 
al. (2015). 
The first two papers document that highly experienced players are more capable at achieving 
tacit profitable collusion and they are more effective as monopolists than inexperienced ones, 
respectively. Harrison et al. (1985) use a design with simulated buyers and decreasing costs; 
monopolists with design experienced get an effectiveness monopoly value higher than value gained by 
inexperienced monopolists; moreover, experienced monopolists perform more homogeneously than 
inexperienced subjects. Benson and Faminov (1988) experimental design, explicitly considers 
‘experience’ as a treatment variable. Two types of markets are run simultaneously: one type is 
composed by experienced participants (subjects with previous participations in similar but not identical 
markets) and the second one involves inexperienced subjects, all facing the same pricing decisions. 
Their results confirm that experience increases the likelihood of cooperation or tacit collusion and 
moreover suggest that the “experimentalists may be able to achieve equilibria without running the very 
large numbers of trials […]. [..] subjects assimilate their experience and can call upon it after a much 
longer time period” (Benson and Faminov 1988, p. 363). 
Marwell and Ames (1980) and Isaac et al. (1984) both consider public good games situations 
and find no significant differences due to the different level of experience of participants.  
The former study reports three replications of previous researches about the predictive utility of the 
free-rider hypothesis regarding the provision of public goods by groups. One of the three replications 
considers the role of experience and shows that experienced subjects do not behave very differently 
from inexperienced ones in that situation. Isaac et al. (1984) attempt to draw together the ideas of three 
previous works
9
 about free-riding concept, by trying to reconcile divergences in their experimental 
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results. As in the former experiment, in one treatment, authors compare inexperienced versus 
experienced subjects and no effect of experience is found.  
Bolton (1991) finds a similar negative result in an experiment involving alternating-offer 
bargaining. His data shows no evidence that greater subjects experience determines pecuniary-
equilibrium play and, with experience, the average of offers do not change, while standard errors 
decrease.  
The more recent contribution of Matthey and Regner (2013) explore whether subjects’ 
experience spills over between experiments. Their meta-analysis considers data from four different 
studies
10
 involving allocation decisions in which the subjects’ choices were combined with information 
about their past experiment participations stored in the online recruiting system used. They, more 
specifically, test the independence of history between experiments when there is no connection 
between experiments and the sessions are spread out over longer time spans. Their results show a 
negative correlation between the number of participations in lab sessions and generous behavior in the 
allocation situation, that is, subjects with a high number of participations tend to be less generous in 
allocation decisions. Therefore, giving decreases with the number of participations in experiments and 
so, the independence between experiments involving allocation decisions cannot be presumed if 
subjects participate in lab sessions repeatedly. 
Conte et al. (2014) used, as Matthey and Regner (2013) the information on students’ past 
participation in economic experiments stored in their database to analyse whether behavior in public 
goods games is affected by experience and history. In their study, the ‘experience’ measures the level 
of previous participation in social dilemma-type experiments, while ‘history’ denotes previous 
participations in experiments involving games different from social dilemmas. They find three main 
results: contributions by subjects and the expectation about others’ contributions decrease with 
experience; a mixture model reveals that the proportion of unconditional co-operators decreases with 
experience, while that of selfish individuals increases and history also influences subjects’ behavior 
although less than experience.  
Focusing on cooperation in one-shot interaction, Capraro and Cococcioni (2015) study the 
history-dependent dynamic process. Many experimental researches suggest that the previous 
experience with economic games on cooperation and the intuition interact with each other such that 
experienced subjects are less cooperative than inexperienced subjects. They run a standard two-person 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which participants are randomly assigned to either of two conditions: 1) the 
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time pressure condition which measures intuitive cooperation; 2) the time delay condition which 
measures deliberate cooperation. Their main findings show that promoting intuition versus deliberation 
has no effect on cooperative behavior among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting 
and that experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time 
pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process rather than an instinctive impulse 
or a self-controlled choice and that, experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition.  
Finally, Xue et al. (2015) replicate and extend a simple riskless choice experiment reported by 
Hochman et al. (2014) as supporting loss aversion for money. One of five hypotheses concerns the 
possible role of experience with experiments. They test whether participants with greater experience in 
experiments will have higher maximization rates in prepayment treatments. They define “experienced” 
participants as those who had participated at least 10 times previously in experimental sessions, and 
“inexperienced” as those who had participated no more than 5 times and find that participants who 
have been in many economics experiments before do not choose differently than those who are relative 
novices. See Tables 1.7-1.8 for a summary of the experimental studies above cited. 
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1.5 Artificial tasks 
Another criticism to parallelism is related to the use of artificial tasks.  
Smith identified two main components which determine a microeconomic system in the laboratory: 
‘environment’ and ‘institution’. The environment specifies each agent’s preference (i.e. initiating 
circumstances, private tastes, and knowledge and skill endowments
11
), initial endowments and the 
technology; while the institution defines the language and the rules that can be used within the 
laboratory.  
However, even though the economic environment is ‘well defined’ (i.e. rewards earned are 
significant enough to be pursued and participants have understood how the rewards are linked to the 
choice-options) the laboratory remains an artificial environment and decisional situations presented are 
generally abstract and unmatched in real life situations. For instance, as Starmer (1999) points out, in 
decision-making under risk experiments, participants are usual to make a series of one-off choices in 
unfamiliar context in which the only feedback about the success of choice strategy comes in the form 
of a payoff to a single task, randomly selected at the end of such experiments.  
Furthermore, experimental tasks are clearly simpler than situations in the real world; for 
example, laboratory experiments often restrict the response mode to a single dimension, whereas real 
world settings almost always involve multiple response modes. Subjects in the experimental laboratory 
“try to make sense of the unfamiliar and incompletely defined experimental environment based on the 
instructions, cues and feedback they receive” (Zizzo 2010, p. 77) and address artificial restrictions on 
set of possible choices. This restriction on available choices can affect subjects’ observed behavior. 
Siakantaris (2000) argues that experimental economists, to achieve the best control over 
variables in order to exclude the effects of disturbing factors, are compelled to harshly specify the 
laboratory situation, raising what the author defines as the ‘experimental economics trade-off’: the 
better experimental economists do their job in controlling variables, the more they are threatened by a 
lack of parallelism and hence of the uselessness of their project.  
The ‘experimental economics trade-off’ represents the trade-off between internal and external 
validity: the simpler the experimental environment, the easier it is to identify the cause(s) responsible 
for a given phenomenon or effect (Guala, 2005). In this way the experimenter can easily replicate the 
idealized assumptions of theoretical models and control variables. Indeed, according to Guala and 
Mittone (2005), adding realistic details to an experiment may imply increasing difficulties in the 
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interpretation of the experimental results; the more artificial the laboratory environment is, better it is 
for the internal validity that benefits from greater abstraction and simplification.  
However, as stressed by Schram (2005), “if the role of experiments shifts from testing theories 
to motivating the development of new theories, the ‘mutual internal validity’ of theory and 
experimental test has the danger of creating its own world” (ivi, p.234). 
A clear example of artefact in lab is represented by standard dictator game; as explained clearly 
by Zizzo (2010) dictator games settings are highly artificial: participants are asked to give some 
amount of money, if they want, to strangers. 
Situation like this are totally unlikely in the real world. In the everyday life few people or no 
one decide to give money at random strangers. Donations are usually made to family members, specific 
organisations or face-to-face to people requesting money, so dictator games results’ can be misleading 
about the extent of faceless interpersonal altruism (Bardsley, 2008). Eckel and Grossman (1996) find 
that there is a significant increase in donations when we increase the extent to which a donation goes to 
a recipient generally agreed as “deserving.” Hoffman et al. (1996) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) show 
that even if the dictator is not identified officially, seeing one’s counterpart and getting information 
about the counterpart increases the possibility that a subject dictator will engage in positive reciprocity. 
Similar evidence are found when it is available a picture of the recipient (Burnham, 2003), other 
information are provided on recipients (Brañas-Garza, 2006) and there are visual suggestions of 
observation (Haley and Fessler, 2005). Specifically, Bardsley (2008) investigates whether dictator 
game can be considered a good tool to measure altruism, or whether it should be considered an artefact 
of experimentation. Author compares a standard dictator game to taking game (i.e. a dictator game with 
a modified set of options that include the opportunity to take instead to give or not something to the 
counterpart). His results show that a simple manipulation of the action set leads to drastic changes in 
behavior. Most of subjects’ generosity appears to be reversible when there is sufficient opportunity to 
take
12
. As suggested by Guala and Mittone (2010), the Dictator Game experimental design “on its own, 
is probably too unusual and too abstract to trigger any real-life normative behavior. Indeed, the 
variability observed in experiments is probably due to the fact that all sort of norms (even conflicting 
ones) can be triggered by adding small cues to the basic design” (ivi, p. 584). The attention for the 
dictator games’ usefulness should be shifted “away from the testing of preference theories, and towards 
theories of social norms” (ibidem).  
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1.6 Inadequateness of incentives 
The debate on monetary incentives in experiments figures among issues related to the external 
validity of research findings. The inadequateness of incentives in experiments may also affect subjects’ 
behavior during experimental sessions and therefore making invalid data outside the lab.  
‘Actual choice versus hypothetical choice’ has become one of the characteristic that distinguishes 
experiments published in economics journals from those in psychology journals. “Whereas […] 
economists almost always pay participants according to clearly defined performance criteria; 
psychologists usually pay a flat fee or grant a fixed amount of course credit” (Hertwig and Ortmann 
2001, p. 384).  
One of the first experiments on individual choice, realized by L.L. Thurston in 1931, was harshly 
criticized by W. Allen Wallis and Milton Friedman (1942) in relation to the use of hypothetical choices 
to experimentally elicit individual indifference curves. According to two authors, just actual stimuli can 
determine actual reactions by participants, whilst hypothetical stimuli clearly are not able to satisfy this 
goal (Roth, 1993). 
Several economists
13
 are in agreement that financial incentive makes clear the goal that has to be 
performed. There exists an interaction between motivations and incentives that determines agents’ 
behavior, but while people’s motivations are not controllable by the experimenter, incentives represent 
design decisions and it should be made considering the purpose of research. Usually, economic 
researchers carefully consider the structure of tasks related incentives, that is, how, how far and why 
they may affect subjects’ behavior.  
As summed up by Hertwig and Ortmann (2001), economists use financial incentives for at least four 
reasons: 1. Because they believe that salient payoff reduces variability (Davis and Holt, 1993); 2. For 
the assumption that saliency is easier to implement than other incentive; 3. Because for financial 
rewards there is no satiation over the course of an experiment; 4. And finally the most important 
reason, because the majority of economics experiments test the economic theory that requires, given its 
maximization assumptions, financial incentives. The same ‘cognitive effort’ is considered, in order to 
economists, as a scarce resource, so not-paid experimental subjects “will not invest cognitive effort to 
avoid making judgment errors [...]
14” (ivi, p. 391).  
In their target article, two authors have examined some articles concerning financial incentives, 
published in the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making from 1988 to 1997. Results show that financial 
                                                          
13
 Harrison, 1992; Roth 1995; Smith, 1991; Smith and Walker 1993a; 1993b. 
14
 Smith 1976; 1982; see also Harrison 1989 and 1992. 
30 
 
incentives seem to have a two-fold effect: the convergence of the data toward the performance criterion 
(even if they do not assure optimal decisions
15
) and the reduction of the data’s variance; moreover, they 
matter more in some areas than in others (in researches on judgment and decision making). 
However, overall their analysis shows that the effect sizes for financial incentives are very variable.  
These findings are in line with Camerer and Hogarth (1999). They review 74 experimental papers 
focused on the level of financial performance-based incentive in order to understand when subjects 
should be paid and why. Their results show that incentives sometimes improve performance, but often 
do not. In some case higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judgment and decision-tasks 
(like in judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items from memory, or clerical tasks), 
sometimes instead, they do damage when problems are too difficult or intuitive. For instance, in 
auctions, risky choices and games, incentives do not affect mean performance, but often reduce 
variance in responses. Moreover, it may happen that in some unfamiliar situations, incentives may 
guide subjects from “favourable ‘self-presentation’ behaviour toward more realistic choices. (For 
example, when they are actually paid, subjects who dictate allocations of money to others are less 
generous and subjects choosing among gambles take less risk)” (ivi, p. 17). 
Gintis, in the ‘Commentary’ of Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) target paper, points out how economists 
use game theory to design and interpret experiments. It is the Game Theory that gives a general 
framework for modelling strategic action and interaction: by defining ‘the characteristics of players, the 
rules according to which they interact, the informational structure available to the agents, and the 
payoffs associated with particular strategic choices; so from this point of view, the specification of a 
careful financial incentive is a precondition to predict agent’s behavior. However, it may happen that 
explicit payoffs do not enter in the subject’s objective function; for example, in the Ultimatum Game, 
are fairness and reciprocity to enter in the subjects’ objective functions, irrespective of explicit 
monetary payoffs. As suggested by the author, maybe, the most important reason to have monetary 
payoffs is to avoid the subject trying to indulge what she/he considers the wishes of the experimenter; 
financial incentives are able to attenuate this motivation in significant way (ivi, pp. 411-412). 
Therefore, leaning exclusively on financial incentives to make clear the economic structure in the lab 
experiments might determine the missing of some significant phenomena. For instance, to the extent 
that people treat possessions differently from money, this would have been a hard effect to observe if 
the only payoffs available to subjects had been monetary (see Kahneman et al., 1990).  
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To sum up with a Bardsley et al. (2010) statement: “there are objectives for which very high-related 
incentives would be important; others for which quite modest ones would be adequate; and others […] 
for which task-related incentives might be actually harmful”. 
A good experimenter should consider that there are situations in the real world in which profit 
maximization may have an important role but not decisive and, cases in which, financial incentives 
interact with nonpecuniary incentives in ways that are not understood (i.e. in a tournament situation).  
“Although the use of monetary incentives in an experiment probably rarely decreases external validity, 
given that they are probably not the most important source of motivation in daily economic life, their 
contribution to external validity is likely to be minimal” (Loewenstein 1999, p. F32). 
 
1.7 Insufficient opportunity to learn by experience 
Lab experiments are often made up on a series of periods in which subject performs the same 
activity repeatedly. Stationary replication of activity is usually used by experimental economist as a 
technique for increasing external validity, because seems to be that subjects’ behavior is more 
representative at the end of a series of repetitions. Indeed, during the first task, participants could be 
confused or they could not have understood roles or rules or, in a computerized experiment, how 
software works and thus, data obtained might be misleading. To prevent it, repeated trials are usually 
run and feedback of their previous performance provided. Plott (1996) in the analysis about the 
‘discovered preference hypothesis’, tries to explain how “with practice and experiences, under 
conditions of substantial incentives, and with the accumulating information that it is obtained from the 
process of choice, the attitudes stabilize in the sense of a consistent decision rule, reflecting the 
preferences that were discovered through the process” (ivi, p. 228). So, the repetition could be useful to 
understand whether the data are results of confusion and inexperience (Ledyard, 1995). 
However, an experimental study conducted by Hey (2001) seeks to determine whether such 
noise is relatively transitory and decays with experience; his results show a high degree of variability in 
subjects’ responses and subjects’ behavior during the experiment. For some subjects replications of the 
tasks improve the consistency of their decisions while for other the noise remains high and the 
identification of the underlying preference function remains difficult. 
Moreover, some consider stationary repetition useful because subjects may apply what they 
learn to their behavior in other situations. This phenomenon called “transfer of learning” appears weak 
and its weakness was proved by psychological and economic studies. As far as it concerns 
psychological works, Bassok et al. (1995) results show that trained subjects through several repetitions 
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give wrong answers when the problem is changed even only superficially. So, “transfer of learning” 
across situations is very weak even when subjects are aware that their previous experience is relevant 
for a second task. From the side of experimental economics, in an auction experiment, Kagel and Levin 
(1986) find that even if subjects who learned the rule after several repetitions in a 3-person auction, are 
able to improve their performance in that situation (that is, avoiding winner’s curse), they are not able 
to generalize what they have learned in a slightly different situation (placed in a 6-person auction 
instead to lower their bids, they raise them).  
Furthermore, stationary replications are unusual in the economic life; in fact there are few real-
world settings in which subjects are engaged with repetitive situations. So, if on one side stationary 
repetitions can reduce confusion and make clear the microsystem built in lab, on the other side the 
same tend “to repress certain types of psychological motives, such as fairness, that may play a 
prominent role in early-period play” (Loewenstein 1999, p. F29). 
 
1.8 Conclusions 
The use of lab experiments in economics has enormously grown over the last three decades and 
is still growing, even if there is some resistance among academics who argue that experimental data 
lack generalizability. In this chapter we have reviewed the more salient articles dealing with the main 
problems related to the external validity and, we have not found a univocal answer: some studies do 
confirm biases linked to all these issues, others instead, do not.  
The choice of particular samples, tasks, incentives or methods, is ultimately a matter of the underlying 
research question and as suggested by Falk and Heckman (2009) the wiser choice is always to conduct 
more lab experiments not fewer, to address all possible elements of bias which may undermine, in 
terms of robustness, the results coming from the lab and their generalizability to the real word. 
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Table 1.1  Self-selection of participants: Experimental studies 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between samples
Eckel & Grossman (2000)
Lab subjects                    
(Volunteers)
vs.
Classroom subjects
(Pseudo Volunteers)
168 subjects out to 181 made useable decisions in a dictator game
experiment with a charity as recipient. 81 subjects played four sessions
conducted during class time (Pseudo Volunteers, PV) and 87 subjects were
recruited to run a lab experiment (Volunteers, V). Each subject selected a
single charity, from a list of ten, to receive any contributions made and
completed twelve allocation decision problems, determining how many of
the tokens in her/his endowment to keep and how many to pass to her
charity partner.
1) In the ‘PV’ sessions, 16 subjects out to 81 contributed with
the entire endowment to their charities for all 12 decisions,
while only 1 out of 87 of the ‘V’ subjects gave everything. At
the same time, none of the ‘V’ and only two of the ‘PV’ passed
nothing;                                                                                                         
2) The ‘PV’ are significantly more generous in their contributions 
to the charities in all treatments. In every case, the ‘PV’ donated
between 22 and 50 % more tokens than did the ‘V’. The means
are significantly different (p-values < 0.006) in every case;
3) They reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the
distributions of contributions made by ‘PV’ and ‘V’ (Epps-
Singleton test,  p-value < 0.03);
4) Non-monetary factors such as religion or altruistic preferences
have a greater effect on the giving behaviour of Pseudo
Volunteers.
Yes 
Cleave et al. (2010)
Lab subjects                              
vs.
Classroom subjects           
*(same population)
Authors used two experimental tasks to measure individual preferences: a
trust Game and a lottery choice task.
Overall 1,451 students attended the classroom experiment (with 254
students assigned to a control treatment). Of the 1,197 students, 1,173
were agreed to participate in the classroom experiment. After 3 months it
was sending an e-mail to the students who had expressed an interest in
participating in experiments (12 percent of the students from the
classrooms). So they also participated to the lab experiment.
1) On average, they do not detect any significant selection bias
based on observable characteristics;
2) Students who send less in the trust game are more likely to
self-select into the lab experiment, but any significant difference
is found in the likelihood to participate in the lab experiment
based on either the lottery choice or the percent returned in the
trust game;
3) Of the 9 pair-wise tests which examine whether there is
selection bias between subgroups, they only detect one
significant and one marginally significant difference in selection;
women are significantly more likely than men to participate the
riskier the lottery they choose, and commerce students are
marginally more likely to participate than non-commerce
students
No
Falk et al. (2010) ‘study 1’
Participating in lab students
vs.
Non-participating in lab 
students
They use a naturally occurring donation decision as a measure of
participants’ and non-participants’ prosocial inclination; as a proxy they
used students' decisions about whether or not they want to contribute a
pre-determined amount to two social funds which provide charitable
services (required each semester by the University). A subsample of the
students in the lab dataset performs a modified dictator game.
1) The raw data analysis does not reveal any significant
difference in prosocial inclinations between participants and non-
participants;
2) Students with stronger prosocial inclinations are neither more
likely to participate in experiments (extensive margin), nor do
they participate more often (intensive margin).
No
Table 1. Self-selection of participants: Experimental studies
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Table 1.2 Self-selection of participants: Experimental studies 
 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between samples
Anderson et al. (2013)
Self-selected students
vs.
Self-selected Non student 
adults
vs.
Non-Self-Selected Trainee 
Truckers
All subjects (1261 participants) are exposed to the same experimental
protocol. They belong to three different population which differ whether
subjects are undergraduate college students or not, and/or in the procedures
used to recruit them. In the experiment subjects play a social dilemma game
(Two-Person Sending Task) exactly once, and are asked to make decisions
in both roles.
1) The pro-social inclinations of subjects who self-selected into
the experiments do not appear to be significantly different from
the inclinations of those who had instead very little opportunity
to self-select into the study;
2) Data also reject the more specific hypothesis that approval-
seeking subjects are the ones most likely to select into
experiments;
3) the share of individuals exhibiting other-regarding concerns, is
remarkably smaller among college students, even after controlling
for observable differences in socio-demographic characteristics
among subject pools. They observe a large difference between
self-selected college students and self-selected adults: the
students appear considerably less pro-social.
No
Exadaktylos et al. (2013)
Students Volunteers
vs. 
Non-Students Volunteers
Students Volunteers
vs. 
Students Non-Volunteers
Non-Students Volunteers
vs. 
Non-Students Non-Volunteers
Students Volunteers
vs. 
Students Non-Volunteers, Non-
Students Volunteers,
Non-Students Non-Volunteers
Students Volunteers
vs. 
Non-Students Non-Volunteers
The study employs data from a survey-experiment conducted with a
representative sample of a city’s population (765 participants). Authors
used behavioural data from five experimental decisions in three canonical
games: dictator, ultimatum and trust games. The dataset includes students
and non-students as well as volunteers and non-volunteers.
1) Students Volunteers vs. Non-Students Volunteers: students
are more strategic players mostly because they make less
generous DG offers. However, these differences are never larger
than 6% of the pie;
2) Students Volunteers vs. Students Non-Volunteers and Non-
Students Volunteers vs. Non-Students Non-Volunteers:
volunteers are more likely to both trust and to reciprocate the
trust than non-volunteers in the TG. However, the first
difference vanishes when making pairwise comparisons within
groups. That is, the aggregate effect is not specifically
attributable to either students or non-students; 
3) Finally, the behaviour of Students Volunteers is different from
the rest of the sample only regarding UG offers, and at
marginally significant levels; comparison between Students
Volunteers and Non-Students Non-Volunteers yields only one
(marginally) significant result as well. Self-selected students
increase their offers between DG and UG more than non-self-
selected, non-students.
No
Table 1 (cont.) Self-selection of participants: E erimental studie
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Table 1.3 1Representativeness of students samples: Experimental studies 
 
 
 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between samples
Cooper et al. (1999)
Chinese Students
vs.
Chinese Managers
They examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China in
a ratchet effect game, comparing behaviour between: (i) students and
managers with field experience in this situation, (ii) standard monetary
incentives versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions
conducted “in context”, making explicit reference to interactions between
planners and managers, and those without any such references.  
Each experimental session employ between 12 and 16 subjects. Subjects are 
randomly divided into two groups, firms and central planners. A total of 36
games are played in each session, with subjects switching roles after every
6 games.
As far as it concerns students' and managers' behaviour:
1) a fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial
levels of strategic play. There are relatively large and statistically
significant incentive effects on firms’ play, with significantly
more strategic play in early rounds of high-pay student sessions
compared to standard-pay student sessions. Over time, the
standard-pay students are able to erase this difference, suggesting 
that experience and incentives act as substitutes for each other;
2) games played in context generate greater levels of strategic
play for managers, with minimal impact on students; context has
a much larger and more consistent effect on managers than on
students. 
In addition, this impact materialize faster and is more robust for
managers in their role as central planners than in their role as
firms. Contrary to the authors’ expectations, students in the role
as firms exhibit significantly higher initial levels of strategic play
than older, more experienced managers; this surprising result is
due to the age and/or lower educational levels of older managers.
Yes
Fehr & List (2004)
Students
vs.
CEOs
Authors study the hidden costs and returns of incentives in situations
requiring trust and trustworthiness using two versions of a Trust game
(standard and with punishment (TWP)). 
They recruit 126 subjects for the student treatments from the
undergraduate student body at the University of Costa Rica and 76 CEOs.
As far as it concerns the comparison between students and
CEOs:
1) CEO principals transfer more money than students.
Moreover, for
any given transfer level, CEO agents pay back more money than
students; 2) the majority of CEO and student principals use the
punishment option in the TWP condition. However, CEOs use
the punishment option less
often;
3) CEO agents pay back more money if the punishment option
is not available than when it is available and used. Student agents
pay back the same amount of money irrespective of whether the
option is not available or available and used. Neither CEO nor
student principals who use the punishment option gain in
material terms if they are deprived of the option;
4) CEOs consistently achieve higher efficiency levels.
Yes
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Table 1.4 Representativeness of students samples: Experimental studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between samples
Haigh & List (2005)
Undergraduate Students
vs.
Professional Traders
In a between subjects design, undergraduate students and professional
traders play a lottery to investigate about the ‘myopic loss aversion’ in
two distinct treatments: Treatment with frequent feedback (F) and
Treatment with  no frequent feedback (I) .
Authors used a specific pool of professional traders recruited from the
Chicago Board of Trade.
1) In F traders bet less than students, whereas in I they bet more
than students. Comparing student and trader data in I, they find
that traders bet significantly more than students;
2) in F, while traders consistently bet less than students, the
differences are never statistically significant at conventional
levels;
3) combining the results of F and I: traders fall prey to MLA to a 
greater degree than students
Yes
Carpenter et al. (2005)
Undergraduate Students
(Middelbury College)
vs.
Non- traditional Students
(Kansas Community College)
vs.
Workers
In a social framing study, they compare three different samples:
undergraduates at small liberal arts college in Vermont (Middelbury
College), students of a junior college in Kansas City (Kansas Community
College), and workers of a publishing distribution warehouse in Kansas
City (using an identical protocol in the field). Participants play an
Ultimatum game and a Dictator game.
1) In the Ultimatum Game, offers of Non-traditional Students are 
higher both than workers and students. In the Dictator game
employees are more generous than both typologies students;
2) proposers in the Ultimatum Game in the two experiments in
Kansas City made more generous offers than students at the
Middlebury College, even controlling for demographic
differences (it confirmed the regional differences hypothesis);
3) Kansas City students offer significantly more than both
Kansas City workers and Middlebury college students,
respectively, whilst in the Dictator Game, are the workers the
more generous among all samples; 4) both samples of students
show a drop in the average allocations between two games, while
the workers offer the same amount, on mean, in both games.
Yes
Bellemare &  Kroger (2007)
Students
vs.
Non-Students 
Representative Sample of 
Dutch population
Participants play an investment game in which a sender and a responder are
both endowed with 500 points; the sender can send money to the
responder from his endowment (he/she got a set of 11 investment
possibilities). The amount sent is doubled by the experimenters and added
to the endowment of the responder. Responders make their decisions using
the strategy method.
1) The sample distributions of investments are significantly
different between two samples;
2) senders have an estimated 50% probability of making a loss
when playing against a random responder from the Dutch
population, as opposed to a significantly higher probability
when interacting with a responder from the laboratory;
3) the return ratio distribution is more dispersed in the student
sample than in the representative sample.
Overall, students’ behaviour in lab differs from that in the
representative sample, with students who make significantly
lower investments and rewarding significantly less investments
than representative participants.
Yes
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Table 1.5 Representativeness of students samples: Experimental studies 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between samples
Carpenter et al. (2008)
Students
vs.
Community members
They run a Dictator Game in which students and random members of the
community have to choose which charity to support and how much to
donate. Firstly, participants have to choose among 13 charities to take the
role of recipient (if participants do not like any of the 13 options, they can
add one to own choice); once chosen a charity, they are then asked to
divide $100 between the charity and themselves.
1) Students allocate significantly less to charity. If it is
considered the fraction of people giving away all of the money,
the proportions test confirms that students are much less likely
to allocate all the money to charity;
2) community members choose their own charity and donate
significantly more (32% of them give the entire endowment).
3) Overall, students’ sample does not appear representative in
the specific context of the charitable giving and the Dictator
Game.
Yes 
Belot et al. (2010)
Students
vs.
Non Students
They run six experimental sessions: two with students, two with
nonstudents and two with a mixed population (a total of 128 subjects). In
each session, each subject play five different games. Three games invoke
other regarding preferences: the Dictator Game (non-strategic and one-
shot); the Trust Game (strategic and one-shot); and the Public Good Game
(strategic and repeated). 
Two games, instead, involve cognitive capabilities and no other-regarding
preferences: Beauty-contest (or Guessing Game); and the Second-price
sealed bid auction.
1) Students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus
agents than non-students in games involving other-regarding
preferences (Dictator Game, Trust Game and Public Good
Game). These differences persist even
when controlling for demographics, cognitive ability and risk
preferences; 2) in games that do not engage other-regarding
preferences (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction) there is
limited evidence of differences in behaviour between subject
pools. 
In none of the five games there is evidence of significant
differences in comprehension between students and non-
students;
3) within subject analyses indicate that students are highly
consistent in their other-regarding preferences while non-student
subjects are inconsistent across other-regarding games.
Yes/No
Falk et al. (2010)
‘study 2’
Students
vs.
Representative sample 
Authors conduct two identical trust experiments using distinct subject
pools, students and a representative sample of the population of the city of 
Zurich, to investigate whether students and non-students exhibit different
prosocial inclinations. 1296 participants run the experiment, 295 recruited
from the student pool, 1001 recruited from the general population; authors
use the same recruitment procedure, the same instructions, the same
decision process and the same financial incentives for participants in both
experiments.
1) By examining 'trusting behaviour' of first movers, a simple
comparison between the two groups reveals only a small
difference across the two subject pools not statistically
significant;
2) by investigating about second movers’ behaviour, they find
that for every possible first mover transfer, students make lower
average repayments than non-students. All differences are
statistically significant;
3) overall, students’ and non-students’ reciprocation pattern is
very similar; the only difference being that students reciprocate
on a lower absolute level.
Yes/No
Cappelen et al. (2015)
Students
vs.
Representative sample
Economics Students
vs.
Non-Economics Students
Authors address the question whether lab experiments on student
populations are useful to identify the motivational forces present in society 
at large by comparing the behaviour of a nationally representative
population with different student populations into the lab.
Participants play four standard dictator games (two as dictator and two as
passive recipient) and ten trust games (five as sender and five as
responder).
1) Their study demonstrates that student subject groups may
not be representative of the social preferences in society at large.
They differ from a representative group of non-students both in
their level of selfishness and in the relative importance assigned
to different moral motives; 
2) economics students and non-economics students differ in their
level of selfishness.
Yes 
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Table 1.6 The WEIRD people: Summary Enrich et al. (2010) meta-analysis 
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between groups
Henrich et al. (2010)
1)
Industrialized societies
vs.
Small-scale societies
2)
Western
vs.
Non-Western societies
3)
Contemporary Americans
vs.
Rest of the West
4)
Typical contemporary 
American subjects
vs.
Other Americans
Authors present a meta-analysis about a comparison between WEIRD
(Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) people and other 
population. 
They first discuss the evidence about differences between populations
drawn from industrialized societies and small-scale societies in some basic
psychological domains (visual perception, fairness and cooperation in
economic decision-making, folkbiological reasoning, spatial cognition and
potential differences).
As second contrast, they review data which compare Western with non-
Western populations about four of the most studied domains: social
decision making (fairness, cooperation, and punishment), independent
versus interdependent self-concepts (and associated motivations), analytic
versus holistic reasoning, and moral reasoning.
The third contrast regards the contemporary American versus the rest of
the west population about individualism and related psychological
phenomena. The last one comparison investigates about the differences
between typical contemporary American subjects and other Americans:
considering education for comparisons among contemporary adult
Americans; spatial reasoning for comparisons subpopulations of American
children; and psychological aspects for comparison between contemporary
Americans and previous generations.
1) Although there are several domains in which the data from
small-scale societies appear similar to that from industrialized
societies, comparative projects involving visual illusions, social
motivations (fairness), folkbiological cognition, and spatial
cognition all show industrialized populations as outliers;
2) Westerners emerge as unusual – frequent global outliers – on
several key dimensions (although robust patterns have emerged
among industrialized societies). Many differences are not merely
differences in the magnitude of effects but often show qualitative
differences which involve effects reversals or novel phenomena
such as allocentric spatial reasoning and antisocial punishment;
3) Few research programs have explicitly sought to compare
Americans with other Westerners on psychological or
behavioural measures. However, those phenomena for which
there are sufficient data to make cross-population comparisons,
reveal that American participants are exceptional even within the
unusual population of Westerners – outliers among outliers;
4) Numerous findings from multiple disciplines indicate that,
in addition to many similarities, there are differences among
typical subjects and the rest of the American population in
unexpected domains. In some of these domains
the data from American undergraduates represent even more
dramatic departures from the patterns identified in non-Western
samples. Further, contemporary American college students
appear further removed along some of these dimensions than did
their predecessors a few decades earlier. Typical subjects may be
outliers within an outlier population.
Yes 
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Table 1.7 The role of experience lab: Experimental studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marwell & Ames (1980)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
The study reports three replications of previous researches about the
predictive utility of the free-rider hypothesis regarding the provision of
public goods by groups. One out the three replications considers the role of
experience. Authors examined the effects of previous experience on
investment behaviour. 
1) Overall this study shows that experienced subjects do not
behave differently from inexperienced subjects in this situation;
2) The mean investment of all subjects run under conditions in
this study it is 94 tokens, while it is 106 for the experienced
subjects. 
Neither the means nor variances differed significantly (F-test).
No 
Isaac et al. (1984) 
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
In this experiment, given a specific endowment of resources, participants
face the decision of allocating between an individual exchange (private good) 
and a group exchange (public good). It involves three treatment effects: (1)
group size, (2) per capita return from the group investment, and (3)
inexperienced versus experienced subjects. They define as experienced
group of participants a group in which all subjects have previously
participated at least one experiment in this particular experimental
environment, although not with a group of the same composition of
individuals. Their design provides 40 paired observations where the only
difference within a pair is experience..
As far as it concerns the experience treatment:
1) Free riding increases with experience, however they are not
able to claim with any degree of confidence that this difference
cannot have been random.
No 
Benson & Faminov (1988)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
In this experiment, authors investigate about the role of experience of
participants in posted price oligopoly markets. The purpose of
experimental markets was to determine if previous participations influence
subsequent pricing decisions. Three experimental sessions are run in three
consecutive weekdays; in each session eight experienced subjects are paired
in four duopolies, and eight inexperienced subjects are paired in other four
markets.
1) Comparison of data from the two market types show that
experience increases the likelihood of cooperation or tacit
collusion;
2) Participants assimilate their experience and call upon it after a
much longer time period (one month in this case).
Yes 
Bolton (1991)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
Author run an experiment involving alternating-offer bargaining; it
comprised ten cells, each distinguished by three treatment variables:
structure, subject experience, and discount factors. 
As far as it concerns the experience hypothesis:
1) the average observed of opening offers for each round of
experienced subjects is virtually identical to that of the final
rounds obtained with inexperienced subjects;
2) the standard errors are smaller for experienced subjects than
for inexperienced subjects, making it possible to reject the
hypothesis of pecuniary-equilibrium play with experienced
subjects at all conventional levels of significance
No 
Author(s) Experimental details General Results
Evidence of difference 
between types
Experiment
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Table 1.8 The role of experience lab: Experimental studies 
Matthey & Regner (2013) 
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
To assess the influence of previous experiment participation on subjects’
behaviour, authors analyse data from four different studies, all involving
allocation decisions: Dictator game variant by Güth et al. (2009); three
dictator and ultimatum game variants by Klempt and Pull (2009); mini
trust game by Regner and Harth (2010) and mini trust game by Bracht and
Regner (2011).
In the four studies, subjects who participated in more
experiments show significantly less generous behaviour than
subjects who participated in less experiments; regression
analysis shows a negative correlation between the number of
previous participations in experiments and generous behaviour in
the allocation situation.
Yes 
Conte et al. (2014)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
The basic decision situation is a linear public goods game. Authors
investigate whether and how contribution choices and their dynamics in
public goods experiments are affected by i) previous participation in social
dilemma-type experiments, which will be referred to as experience; and ii)
previous participation in experiments different from the social dilemmas,
which will be referred to as history.  
1) On average, the experienced systematically contribute with
smaller amounts than the inexperienced;
2) on average, the experienced subjects systematically expect the
other participants to contribute smaller amounts than the
inexperienced;
3) on average, the experienced’s beliefs tend to be more accurate
than those of the inexperienced from the middle of the game;
4) history influences the proportions of the population but it
affects less than experience.
Yes 
Capraro & Cococcioni
(2015)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
Authors wonder about cooperation decision-making in one-shot
interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process; several evidences
suggest that cooperation decision-making in one-shot interaction is most
likely when players have a history in participation in similar games
sessions. They run a standard two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma in which
participants are randomly assigned to either of two conditions: 1) the time
pressure condition which measures intuitive cooperation; 2) in the time
delay condition which measures deliberate cooperation. They use a self-
reported measure of experience; participants are asked to answer to what
extent they have previously participated in other studies like that (e.g.,
exchanging money with strangers)?" using a 5 point Likert-scale from
‘Never’ to ‘Several times’: a subject was considered inexperienced if he or
she answered ‘never’.
As far as it concerns the experience topic, they find two major
results: 1) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect
on cooperative behaviour among inexperienced subjects living in
a non-cooperative setting; 
2) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced
subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest
that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive
impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates
primarily via the channel of intuition.
Yes 
Xue et al. (2015)
Experienced participants
vs.
Inexperienced participants
Authors replicate and extend a simple riskless choice experiment reported
by Hochman et al. (2014) as supporting loss aversion for money. One out
of five hypotheses concerns the possible role of experience with
experiments. They test whether participants with greater experience in
experiments will have higher maximization rates in prepayment treatments.
They defined “experienced” participants as those who had participated at
least 10 times previously in experimental sessions, and “inexperienced” as
those who had participated no more than 5 times.
Concerning to experience’s effect, participants who have been in
many economics experiments before do not choose differently
than those who are relative novices.
No
Author(s) Experimental details Experiment General Results
Evidence of difference 
between types
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Chapter 2 
 
On the Representativeness of Standard Laboratory Subjects: An 
Experimental Study with Simple Binary Dictator Games 
 
Abstract. The use of convenient pool of college students in economic experiments represents one of 
the most common criticisms related to the generalizability of laboratory data. Replicating in the lab a 
simple experiment originally run with a representative sample of the population, we show that, despite 
the differences between college students and subjects of the general population in terms of 
demographics, cognitive skills and personalities, the observed behavior of the two samples follows a 
common pattern in a set of binary dictator games focusing on several motives for altruistic behavior.  
We compare the choices of undergraduates and subjects representative of population in different 
treatments and with different reward dimensions by exploiting the experimental design used by Pelligra 
and Stanca (2013) to investigate social preferences in a field experiment. Two samples follow a 
common behavioral pattern with the only exception of a significant difference in choices where self-
interest may play a prominent role. This gap seems to be related mainly to the academic background of 
the participants: our sample of undergraduates economics students differ in their degree of self-
interested choices both from the representative group of the population and from its sub-sample of 
students.  
  
 
Keywords: methodology, external validity, experiments, prosocial behavior. 
JEL codes: C91, D03.   
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2.1 Introduction 
One of the most common criticisms about generalizability of experimental data concerns the 
representativeness of subjects pool generally used in economics research. Some scholars agree that the 
external validity of research findings might be frustrated by the use of college students as standard 
sample in experiments. Their massive presence as participants is clearly related to the usual location of 
research centers in universities campuses
16
, to their low opportunity cost and for some peculiarities
17
 
which make them the best sample to test general economic theories.  
College students certainly differ from other samples of population for demographics
18,19
, 
cognitive skills and tend to be more homogeneous. Undergraduates show “unfinished” personalities 
(Carlson, 1971), less-crystallized attitudes and less-formulated senses of self, more unstable peer group 
relationships, stronger tendencies to comply with authority and stronger cognitive skills than to older 
adults (Sears, 1986) and give slightly more homogeneous answers than non-students (Peterson, 2001).  
Moreover, ‘punctual college sophomore’ volunteers are usually interested in research, quite willing to 
collaborate with the experimenter, in pursuit of social approval (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1969) and 
concerned about what their choices tell about them and, he/she could be tempted to validate the 
experimental hypothesis (Orne, 1969).  
The lack of representativeness of this convenient pool has been largely explored. One of the 
first investigations was realized by Gordon et al. (1986). They compare thirty-two studies in which 
groups of students and non-students have participated in identical experiments and find strong 
divergences between two samples in twelve studies
20
.  
The first reflections on topic focused on the possible differences between professionals’ and 
non-professionals’21 (read students) behavior. Cooper et al. (1999) experimentally analyze the 
‘standard’ sample of students addressing several open questions about the development of the ratchet 
                                                          
16
 According to the list drafted by the Laboratoire Montpelliérain d´Economie Théorique et Appliquée, only 2 out of 173 
experimental labs listed are located outside universities campus and, only one is totally independent by academic research 
activities.  
17
 Tendency to have a steep learning curve (Friedman and Cassar, 2004) and to be intelligent and educated (Gätcher, 2010). 
18
 Guillén and Veszteg (2006), by analysing data from a single laboratory comprising 8,755 observations (597 experimental 
sessions from 74 incentive based economic experiments recorded over more than 2 years), find out that demographic 
differences can explain only 4% of the variations on dependent variable considered (payments received). Carbone (2005) 
analyses demographic characteristics in relation with subjects’ strategic behavior. She uses a unique experimental subject 
pool that participated in a life-cycle consumption experiment and finds that demographics have no effect on observed 
behavior. 
19
 See Calder et al., 1981; Greenberg, 1987; Kraus, 1995. 
20
 Allen and Muchinsky (1984); Christensen-Szalanski et al. (1983); Churchill and Cooper (1971); Cornelius et al. (1984); 
Fleming (1969); Hakel et al. (1970a); Hakel et al. (1970b); Jago and Vroom (1982); Kavanagh (1975); Moskowitz (1971); 
Schneider (1982); Stow and Ross (1980). 
21
 For a complete review about differences between professionals and non-professionals see G. R. Fréchette (2015). 
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effect in centrally planned economies; Chinese students exhibit significantly higher initial levels of 
strategic play than older and more experienced Chinese managers. 
The suspicious that professionals’ behavior may differ from non-professionals is confirmed by 
Haigh’s and List’s (2005) work, in which professional traders show greater myopic loss aversion than 
undergraduate students. Differences between the two types of groups are also been found by Fehr and 
List (2004); they investigate experimentally how CEOs respond to incentives and how they provide the 
same in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. By comparing their behavior with the behavior of 
students comes to light that the former are more trusting, show more trustworthiness and use the 
punishment threat less than students.  
The ever-increasing interest for the possible bias related to the use of undergraduates’ sample in 
research is become then, very popular in the studies on social preferences. No wonder saw that “among 
the papers published on social preferences in the top five economics journals
22
 from 2000 to 2010, only 
four out of 24 papers reported from experiments on non-student populations” (Cappelen  et al., 2015).  
In a social framing study, Carpenter et al. (2005) compare three different samples: students at 
Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College, and 
employees at distribution center in Kansas City; they find that proposers in the Ultimatum Game in the 
two experiments run in Kansas City make more generous offers than Middlebury College students, 
even controlling for demographic differences (confirming the regional differences hypothesis); Kansas 
City students offer significantly more than both Kansas City workers and Middlebury college students 
(in that order), whilst in the Dictator Game, are the workers the more generous among all samples. 
Furthermore, their results show that both samples of students have a drop in the average allocations 
between two games, while the workers offer the same amount, on mean, in both games.          
Bellemare and Kröger (2007), instead, explore behavior observed in an investment game 
between a representative sample of Dutch population and students’ pool in the laboratory. Their results 
indicate that trust, trustworthiness and other social preferences, once identified in the lab, are likely to 
be present, with greater intensity, in the population as a whole.  
In a charitable giving game, Carpenter et al. (2008) discover systematic differences between 
random members of the community and students; citizens choose their own charity and donate 
significantly more (32% of them give the entire endowment).  
Whilst, considering a wide set of standard experimental games (Dictator Game, Trust Game, 
Public Good Game, Beauty Contest and Second-price Auction), Belot et al. (2010) find out that, in 
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 American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review 
of Economic Studies. 
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general, students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than non-students in games 
involving other-regarding preferences, while there is not a significant difference between samples in 
the games that do not engage them (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction). 
In one of the two studies published in 2013 by Falk et al., the comparison between the behavior 
of students and the general population using the same experimental protocol (variant of a trust game) 
show that the first movers display a similar behavioral pattern, whilst, in terms of reciprocation (second 
movers play) higher investments are reciprocated with high repayments in both groups, but the level of 
reciprocation is lower for students than for non-students.  
In one of the last studies published on that topic, Cappelen et al. (2015) address the question 
whether lab experiments on student populations are useful to identify the motivational forces present in 
society at large by comparing the behavior of a nationally representative population with different 
student populations into the lab. Their results show that students may not be informative of the role of 
social preferences in the broader population: representative participants differ fundamentally from 
students both in their level of selfishness and in the relative importance assigned to different moral 
motives. 
As in Cappelen et al. (2015), the aim of our investigation is to verify to what extent 
experimental results obtained with undergraduates may be representative of the motivational forces of 
population. We exploit the experimental design and use the results obtained by Pelligra and Stanca 
(2013) in an artefactual field experiment with a representative sample of adults of Sardinian Region. 
We replicate the reference experimental design with a sample of 240 undergraduates of the same region 
in a class experiment. Our contribution enriches the present status of the literature under two main 
respects: first, we exactly follow the reference protocol and experimental design to make a punctual 
comparison between two different samples belonging to the same region (no cultural difference is 
present); second, we use an alternative methodology to disentangle behavior components’ from the 
choices implemented in the binary dictator games. 
In the first part of our analysis we compare results obtained with the two different samples in a 
set of binary-choice dictator games within four treatments and for two reward dimensions, whilst in the 
second one, we make an analysis of differences between samples for single behavioral component.  
Our main results show that there is a common pattern of behavior between students and 
representative subject of population at least as far as it concerns choices that do not engage self-interest 
motives. Our sample of undergraduates appears more sensitive to the loss of a possible payoff and 
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show high level of self-interest that significantly differs from the level scored by representative subjects 
and from the sub-sample of students belonging to the same representative population. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experimental 
procedures and provides specific details about the reference design. In Section 2.3 the testable 
hypotheses are derived. Section 2.4 presents the statistical analyses and the result. Section 2.5 
concludes.  
 
2.2 Experimental procedures 
In this section we describe the experimental tasks and treatments.  
In order to make a comparison between experimental findings obtained with undergraduates and 
representative subjects of population, we exactly replicate the experimental design implemented in a 
field experiment by Pelligra & Stanca (2013), using a sample of 240 undergraduates.  
The experimental design involves four treatments based on binary-choice dictator game with two 
reward dimensions, small (T1-T4) and large (T1L-T4L). Overall, each participant is asked to make 
eight decisions, one with small and another one with large reward for each treatment. One of the two 
allocations is considered as a benchmark and has always equal payoffs for the two players (400, 400). 
The alternative allocations instead vary along the four treatments. 
Table 2.1 summarizes all treatments by considering what type of information comes out when 
players choose alternative allocations in terms of preferences for efficiency, equality, self-interest and 
competition. Briefly, treatments T1 and T2, consider decisions when giving is costless and keeping out 
self-interest as motive of choices. Specifically, in T1 the choice of giving corresponds to the 
benchmark option (400, 400), which increases both efficiency and equality, while the alternative 
allocation (400, 300) is guided by competitive motives. In T2 is the alternative allocation (400, 500) 
that corresponds to the choice of giving and increases efficiency and inequality with respect to the 
benchmark allocation; while, equality and efficiency motives act in opposite direction from each other 
in this treatment. Treatments T3 and T4 explore decisions when giving and no giving are costly 
respectively and, can be guided by self-interest motives. Precisely, the choice of giving in T3 (350, 
500) and in T4 (450, 500) increases efficiency and disadvantageous inequality.  
The same considerations are valid for four large size rewards Dictator Games. 
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Table 2.1 Treatments T1-T4 (small reward) and T1L-T4L (large reward). 
Notes: Column 2 reports allocations that can be chosen as an alternative to the benchmark (400, 400) for small and large reward size 
respectively; columns from 3 to 6 report the sign of the corresponding choice.  
 
We conducted five experimental sessions on January 2011 at the University of Cagliari
23
 
(Sardinia). We run classroom experiments with 240 students recruited during the hour lessons at the 
Department of Business and Economics. We used this procedure as we wanted to minimize the effect 
both of self-selection and of heterogeneity in the cultural background. All the participants were in first 
year of their BA in economics. They were informed that participation was voluntary and, all those did 
not wish to participate, left the classroom. Participants run paper and pencil exercises and each of them 
was randomly matched with a different partner in each situation (perfect stranger matching). A double 
blind anonymity procedure (subject vs. subject and subjects vs. experimenters) was maintained during 
and after the classroom experiments about the participants’ decisions. Instructions with a general 
description of experiment and an explanation of the payment mechanism were also read aloud. 
We used the same incentive system of the Pelligra and Stanca’s design. Once all sessions were 
completed, one of the couples-matched was randomly selected together with one of the 8 situations 
played. A random assignment determined who had to be considered the dictator and who the recipient. 
Dictator’s action was then implemented and the corresponding payoff paid in cash; dictator and 
receiver won both € 400. 
 
2.3 Testable Hypotheses  
According to Gächter (2010), students are often the perfect subject pool for answering some 
fundamental research questions: they are, on average, educated, intelligent and used to learning. All 
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 The instructions are provided in the appendix A. 
Efficiency Equality Self-interest Competition 
T1 - T1L (400, 300) - (400, 0) - - = +
T2 - T2L (400, 500) - (400, 800) + - = -
T3 - T3L (350, 500) - (350, 800) + - - -
T4 - T4L (450, 500) - (450, 800) + - + -
Alternative Allocations
Treatments                                                                                                      Preferences                           
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these characteristics are valuable considering that often, economic theories and especially the theories 
of social preferences, assume cognitive sophistication. 
Following Gächter’s rationale and given our focus on motives for altruistic behavior, we can derive the 
following testable hypotheses. 
 
1
st
 Hypothesis: Samples comparison   
Hp. 1: The first hypothesis concerns the proportions of subjects who decide to give within treatments 
and for both reward dimensions. Our hypothesis is that the population proportion of undergraduates 
who choose to give is equal to the population proportion of representative subjects who make the same 
decision.  
We test this first hypothesis within all treatments and considering both reward dimensions (T1-
T4/T1L-T4L) by using Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. 
 
2
nd
 Hypothesis: Samples comparison for single behavioral components  
Hp. 2: For the second hypothesis we exploit Pelligra’s and Stanca’s design by focusing on motives of 
altruistic behavior behind participants’ choices. Once disentangled different motives (efficiency, 
equality, self-interest and competition) on the decision to give, we verify whether behavioral 
components affect representative subjects’ and undergraduates’ choices differently. 
Our hypothesis is that undergraduates and representative subjects are affected in their choices from 
behavioral components in the same way. 
We test the second hypothesis comparing the total levels of each behavioral component between 
samples by using Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. 
 
2.4 Results  
First, in Table 2.2 we summarize the characteristics of the participants. We enrolled a total of 
240 undergraduates students (141 female and 99 male), while the sample of representative subjects of 
Sardinian population is composed by 611 participants (323 female and 288 male). In addition to a 
series of questions on socio-demographic characteristics, both samples are asked to answer about pro-
social behavior, as captured by donations to non-profit organizations and participation to voluntary 
activity. Moreover we asked a self-reported measure of trust, satisfaction for own life and satisfaction 
about own financial situation. 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of participants 
 
 
2.4.1 Non parametric analysis (Hp. 1) 
 Figures 2.1-2.4 plot participants’ behavior by subjects’ samples: Undergraduates and 
Representative subjects. From a first visual inspection of the graphs, it turns to be quite evident that 
two samples do show the same behavioral pattern as far as it concerns the direction of choices in all 
four treatments and for both reward dimensions. 
In T1 and T1L, where giving is costless and increases efficiency and equality, the 78% of 
undergraduates decide to give in T1, and this fraction rises to 86% in T1L. In the representative sample 
of population, the proportion of givers is the 83% and increases by 6 points percentage in T1L (see 
Figure 2.1). By comparing independent observations, we do not find any difference statistically 
significant between samples. We cannot reject the hypothesis of equality between samples’ 
distributions both for T1 and T1L (p=0.11 and p=0.25, respectively, Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test).   
 
Result 1: When giving is not costly and increases efficiency and equality, we do not find any difference 
statistically significant between two proportions of givers in the two samples. 
Female, # (%) 141 (59%) 323 (53%)
Family Dimension, mean (min-max) 4.2 (1-10) 3.4 (1-8)
Voluntarism, # (%) 61 (25%) 141 (23%)
No Trust, # (%) 198 (83%) 413 (68%)
Donations, # (%) 100 (42%) 433 (71%)
Life satisfaction, mean (min-max) 7.3 (1-10) 7.6 (1-10)
Financial satisfaction, mean (min-max) 6.4 (1-10) 6.3 (1-10)
Undergraduates                  
(n = 240)
Representative subjects        
(n = 611)
Characteristics
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In T2 and T2L, where giving is still costless and there exists a trade-off between efficiency and 
equality, the fraction of undergraduates givers is equal to 49% and decreases to 43%, respectively. In 
the representative sample of population the proportion of givers decreases from 47% in T2 to 43% in 
T2L (see Figure 2.2). Once again, we do not find any difference statistically significant between the 
proportion of givers in two samples both for T2 and T2L (p=0.70 and p=0.87, respectively, Two-sided 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).   
 
Result 2: When giving is not costly and increases efficiency and inequality, we do not find difference 
statistically significant between two samples. 
 
In T3 and T3L, where the decision of giving is costly and increases efficiency and inequality 
disadvantageous, the proportion of students who decide to give in T3 is 11% and increases to 17.5 % in 
T3L. Instead, as we can see from Figure 2.3, the 29% of representative subjects opts for giving in T3 
and 28% in T3L. Even though, students’ and representative subjects’ decisions go to the same 
direction, the fraction of students who choose to give is statistically lower than the proportion of 
representative agents who make the same decision. The statistical comparison between the proportions 
of givers of two different samples points out a significant difference both in T3 and T3L (p<0.00 and 
p=0.00, respectively, Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).   
 
Result 3: When giving is costly, increases efficiency and inequality and decreases self-interest, we do 
find difference statistically significant between two samples.  
 
As far as it concerns T4 and T4L, in which decisions of not giving are now costly and decrease 
efficiency and inequality, students’ and representative subjects’ choices go to the same direction, but 
the proportion of college students and representative agents who decide to give are statistically 
different in T4 (p<0.00, Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) but not in T4L (p=0.15, Two-sided 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). The proportion of students who decide to give in T4 is 68% and 
decreases to 56 % in T4L, while, the 55% of representative subjects opts for giving in T4 and 50% in 
T4L. See Figure 2.4. 
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Result 4: When not giving is costly, increases efficiency, inequality and self-interest, we do find 
difference statistically significant between two samples in T4 but not in T4L. 
 
These numbers show negligible differences between two samples for the first two treatments in 
both reward dimensions and reject any significant behavioral difference.  
We find significant differences only in the last two treatments between samples and for treatment 3 for 
both reward dimensions. Our sample of undergraduates appears more sensitive to the possibility to lose 
an available payoff with respect to the representative sample of population. 
 
Figures 2.1 - 2.4  
        
Figure 2.1 Treatment T1-T1L 
        
Figure 2.2 Treatment T2-T2L 
0.78 
0.83 
0.22 
0.17 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Undergraduates Representative
subjects
T1  
(400, 400) vs (400, 300) 
Give
Keep
0.86 0.89 
0.14 0.11 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Undergraduates Representative
subjects
T1L  
(400, 400) vs (400, 0) 
Give
Keep
0.49 0.47 0.51 
0.53 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Undergraduates Representative
subjects
T2  
(400, 450) vs (400, 400) 
Give
Keep
0.43 0.43 
0.57 0.57 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Undergraduates Representative
subjects
T2L 
 (400, 800) vs (400, 400) 
Give
Keep
51 
 
       
Figure 2.3 Treatment T3-T3L 
       
Figure 2.4 Treatment T4-T4L 
 
2.4.2 Non parametric analysis (Hp.2) 
Now we check whether the different components of behavior, singularly, affect representative 
subjects’ and undergraduates’ choices in a similar way. We have disentangled different motives by 
exploiting the subjects’ decisions in the binary-choice dictator games: a weight that can be -1, 0 or +1 
is assigned to each component along treatments in relation to the predicted effect behind the choice of 
the alternative allocation, as shown in Table 2.1.  
For instance, for the choice of the alternative allocation in the treatment T1-T1L, in which the predicted 
effects are positive for the competition, negative for the equality and the efficiency and null for the self-
interest (absent in this treatment), we assign the weight +1, - 1, -1 and 0, respectively for each 
component, and so on for the other treatments (read the Table 2.3 for each treatment horizontally).  
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After that, we define the total level for each behavioral component, counting for each sample the 
number of points scored in all treatments (read Table 2.3 for each behavioral component vertically). 
 
Table 2.3 Components weights 
Treatments T1-T4 (small reward) and T1L-T4L (large reward). 
 
In the 2nd column are reported alternative allocations for all four treatments and for both reward size (small and large); from 3rd to 6th 
columns are reported weights for each component within treatments. Self-interest weight in T1– T1L and T2 – T2L is equal to zero 
because it does not play any role in these treatments. 
 
The total levels of efficiency, equality and competition scored by the two pools of subjects 
result statistically indistinguishable from each other at any conventional level and in both reward 
dimensions. Instead we find a difference statistically significant for the self-interest motive for both 
reward dimensions (p=0.000 in both dimensions; Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). 
Self-interest component, on average, is statistically higher in undergraduates than in representative 
agents: 1.142 vs 0.517 (small reward dimension) and 0.767 vs. 0.451 (large reward dimension). 
 
Results 5: When we compare each behavioral component between samples, we find that only the total 
level of self-interest is statistically different between undergraduates and representative agents for both 
reward dimensions (see Tables 2.4-2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatments Alternative Allocations Efficiency Equality Self-interest Competition 
T1 - T1L (400, 300) - (400, 0) -1 -1 0 1
T2 - T2L (400, 500) - (400, 800) 1 -1 0 -1
T3 - T3L (350, 500) - (350, 800) 1 -1 -1 -1
T4 - T4L (450, 500) - (450, 800) 1 -1 1 -1
Total level of 
efficiency
Total level of 
equality
Total level of 
competition 
                                                                                          Components weights                          
Total level of            
self-interest
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Table 2.4. Components Comparison: Small reward dimension 
Notes: Columns (5) and (6) are the results of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Nonparametric test. 
 
Table 2.5. Components Comparison: Large reward dimension 
 
Notes: Columns (5) and (6) are the results of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Nonparametric test. 
 
 
In order to check whether the difference in the behavioral component of self-interest between 
samples is related to specific demographic characteristics of subjects, as age or schooling level, we 
compare the sample of undergraduates with the sub-sample of students belonging to representative 
subjects pool. The result of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Nonparametric test show a difference statistically 
significant in the small reward dimension between these two sample of students (p=0.017).  
Behavioral Components Samples Mean Std. Dev MWU - Z p-value
Undergraduates 0.125 2.307
Representative Subjects 0.275 2.35
Representative Subjects 1.031 2.449
Undergraduates -0.125 2.307
Representative Subjects -0.275 2.305
Undergraduates 1.142 1.073
Representative Subjects 0.517 1.078
Total Competition Level -0.584 0.559
-7.572 0
Total Equality Level
Total Self-Interest Level
Total Efficiency Level 0.584 0.559
Undergraduates 0.992 1.892
0.363 0.717
Behavioral Components Samples Mean Std. Dev MWU - Z p-value
Undergraduates 0.05 2.515
Representative Subjects 0.193 2.423
Representative Subjects 1.355 2.437
Undergraduates -0.05 2.515
Representative Subjects -0.0193 2.423
Undergraduates 0.767 1.057
Representative Subjects 0.451 1.008
Total Competition Level -0.74 0.459
-4.047 0
Total Equality Level
Total Self-Interest Level
Total Efficiency Level 0.74 0.459
Undergraduates 1.383 2.146
0.126 0.899
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However, we do not find any difference significant between students of representative sample 
and the rest of the same sample (p=0.809 for the small reward).  
Non parametric analysis suggests that being a student per se it does not seem to be the reason of 
difference found; the high level of self-interest component appears as an own characteristic of our 
sample of undergraduates. Even though we do not have details about the majors of students belonging 
to representative sample, we may speculate about this result, confirming the findings obtained by 
Cappelen et al. (2011) for which students in economics and students in other disciplines mainly differ 
in their level of self-interest; non-economics students appear less selfish than students in economics and 
thus make choices more in line with what we observe in the representative group. 
 
2.4.3 Regression analysis 
So as to check the robustness of the result delivered by the non-parametric analysis in the 
section 2.4.2, we report further GLM regression analyses (Table 2.6 for small reward and Table 2.7 for 
large reward dimensions) that allow to assess if and how the estimates of behavioral components may 
be affected by use of student samples by controlling for richer set of individual-specific factors that 
might influence the behavioral outcomes observed. 
In models (1) (2) (3) (4) we focus on the behavioral components in which the level of 
efficiency, the level of equality, the level of competition and the level of self-interest represent the 
response variables, respectively. 
All these response variables are analysed at the light of our main experimental variable, 
‘Undergraduates sample’; it is a dummy variable that identifies the sample identity, if undergraduates 
or representative subjects of Sardinian population. To follow, ‘Family Dimension’ identifies the 
number of family components self-stated; ‘Voluntarism’ is a dummy variable that identifies whether 
subjects declare to make voluntary work; ‘No Trust’ is a dummy variable that identifies a measure of 
trusting self-reported (participants are asked to answer if they have trust in others or have not); 
‘Donation’ is a dummy variable that identifies whether subjects declare to make donation or not; 
‘Gender’ (male=1) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the subject is a male; ‘Life satisfaction’ 
is a self-reported measure of satisfaction: participants are asked to answer how much they are satisfied 
of their life using a scale from ‘1’ to ‘10’; and finally, ‘Financial satisfaction’ is a self-reported 
measure of satisfaction as well: in this case participants are asked to answer how much they are 
satisfied of their financial situation, using a scale from ‘1’ to ‘10’. 
55 
 
a) Small Reward Dimension 
The GLM estimates for the Undergraduates sample dummy variable reject any statistically 
significant differential effect generated by the group identity - with respect to the representative 
subjects group – concerning each behavioral component with the only exception of the level of self-
interest (see Table 2.6). 
As far as it concerns Model (1), the level of efficiency is affected significantly by dummies ‘No 
Trust’ and ‘Gender’. The level of efficiency is lower in the subjects who have no trust in the people, 
while, men seem to be more efficient with respect to women. In Model (2), we see that women seem to 
be more equalitarian than men. The level of competition, Model (3), is influenced by ‘No Trust’ and 
‘Gender’ dummies; it is higher in the subjects who have stated do not trust of people, while, women 
seem to be more competitive with respect to men. In Model (4), the level of self-interest is not 
influenced by individual characteristics and beliefs.   
This regression analysis confirms the result delivered by the non-parametric analysis: self-
interest is the only behavioral component in which undergraduates sample appears different to 
representative sample. 
 
b) Large Reward Dimension 
Considering the large reward dimension, the GLM estimates confirm that the Undergraduates 
sample dummy variable is statistically significant only with respect to the level of self-interest (see 
Table 2.7).  
As far as it concerns Model (1), the level of efficiency is affected significantly by dummies ‘No 
Trust’, ‘Donations’ and ‘Gender’. In Model (2), we see that women seem to be more equalitarian than 
men. The level of competition, Model (3), is influenced by ‘No Trust’ and ‘Gender’ dummies; it is 
higher in the subjects who have stated do not trust of people, while, women seem to be more 
competitive with respect to men. In the Model (4), the level of self-interest is not influenced by 
individual characteristics and beliefs. As in the Small reward Dimension analysis the result delivered 
by the non-parametric analysis is confirmed by regression analysis: two samples differ only for the 
behavioral component of self-interest. 
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Table 2.6. Behavioral outcomes. GLM regressions. Small Reward Dimension 
 
Notes: ***, **, * for significant level at the 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTCOMES:
Total level of 
efficiency
Total level of 
equality
Total level of 
competition
Total level of          
self-interest
Undergraduates sample (Dummy) 0.112 -0.202 -0.112 0.649***
(0.197) (0.194) (0.197) (0.092)
Family Dimension -0.064 0.09 0.064 0.042
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.031)
Voluntarism 0.111 -0.233 -0.111 -0.04
(0.189) (0.186) (0.189) (0.088)
No Trust -0.484*    0.001 0.484* -0.101
(0.189) (0.186) (0.189) (0.088)
Donations 0.302 -0.263 -0.302 0.095
(0.182) (0.179) (0.182) (0.085)
Gender (Male=1) 0.566*** -0.618***   -0.566*** 0.098
(0.165) (0.162) (0.165) (0.077)
Life satisfaction 0.053 -0.026 -0.053 -0.001
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.028)
Financial satisfaction 0.011 -0.045 -0.011 -0.002
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.021)
Intercept -0.172 1.731*** 0.172 0.349
(0.529) (0.52) (0.529) (0.246)
Observations 851 851 851 851
Null deviance 4443.5 on 809 d.f. 4273.8 on 809 d.f. 4443.5 on 809 d.f. 1006.07 on 809 d.f.
Residual deviance 4293.1 on 801 d.f. 4151.4 on 801 d.f.  4293.1 on 801 d.f. 931.76 on 801 d.f.  
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations 2 2 2 2
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     Table 2.7. Behavioral outcomes. GLM regressions. Large Reward Dimension 
 
       Notes: ***, **, * for significant level at the 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTCOMES:
Total level of 
efficiency
Total level of 
equality
Total level of 
competition
Total level of          
self-interest
Undergraduates sample (Dummy) 0.213 -0.213 -0.213 0.377***
(0.204) (0.196) (0.204) (0.088)
Family Dimension -0.118 0.028 0.118 -0.019
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.029)
Voluntarism 0.142 -0.097 -0.142 -0.029
(0.196) (0.189) (0.196) (0.084)
No Trust -0.575**    0.337   0.575**    -0.041
(0.196) (0.188) (0.196) (0.084)
Donations 0.441* -0.436* -0.441* 0.107
(0.188) (0.181) (0.188) (0.081)
Gender (Male=1) 0.717*** -0.672*** -0.717*** 0.021
(0.171) (0.164) (0.171) (0.073)
Life satisfaction 0.093 -0.049 -0.093 -0.017
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.026)
Financial satisfaction 0.013 -0.023 -0.013 -0.006
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.021)
Intercept -0.468 2.193*** 0.468 0.629**
(0.548) (0.527) (0.548) (0.235)
Observations 851 851 851 851
Null deviance 4861.0 on 809 d.f.  4434.2 on 809 d.f.  4861.0 on 809  d.f   871.16 on 809  d.f     
Residual deviance 4600.5 on 801 d.f. 4265.1 on 801 d.f. 4600.5 on 801  d.f   849.77 on 801 d.f     
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations 2 2 2 2
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2.5 Conclusions 
A rigorous comparison between undergraduates and a representative sample of population is 
surely “a [good] starting point for investigating on social preferences generalizability to the other social 
groups” (Gäcther 2010, p. 93), but mostly it represents a valid way to answer to methodological 
questions about the representativeness of samples usually used in laboratory.  
As we know the most of our knowledge about social preferences comes from experimental findings 
obtained with samples of students. Our results confirm the goodness of that pool for similar studies: 
undergraduates show a similar pattern of behavior with respect to a representative sample of population 
of the same region in a binary-choice dictator game.  
In the first part of our analysis, the simple comparison of samples choices in each treatment 
shows a very similar directional pattern for all treatments. The treatments (T1-T1L), (T2-T2L) and 
(T4L) show, on average, negligible differences and the non-parametric analysis rejects any significant 
behavioral difference between two samples. Instead, we find, in treatments T3-T3L and T4, that the 
proportion of undergraduates who choose the alternative allocations is statistically different with 
respect to the representative subjects sample; when giving is costly the proportion of undergraduates 
who choose to give is statistically lower than the proportion of representative subjects who make the 
same choice, and when not giving is costly, is the proportion of undergraduates who choose to give 
higher than the proportion of representative subjects who make same choice. We note a higher 
sensitivity of undergraduates about the possibility to lose a part of own payoff.  
Finally, when we check for single behavioral component between samples, we find difference only in 
the level of self-interest. Our sample of undergraduates show a statistically higher level of self-interest 
with respect to both the representative subjects sample and the sub-sample of students belonging to the 
same group, confirming a possible academic background effect.  
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
By answering this section of the questionnaire, you can win a substantial prize in euro. You have to 
answer a series of 8 questions. If your name will be extracted among those who participate in this 
survey, one of the 8 answers you provide will be randomly selected to determine the corresponding 
prize. Note that you will be matched to another randomly selected participant, who will also win a prize 
that will depend on your choices.  
Example: 
Which would you choose between the following two options? 
(A) you win 200 euros and the other subject wins 200 euros 
(B) you win 300 euros and the other subject wins 250 euros 
By choosing A, you would win 200 euro and the other subject would win 200 euro.  
By choosing B, you would win 300 euro and the other subject would win 250 euro. 
 
Let us now turn to the actual questions, that might determine your actual win.  
[The order of the 8 choices was randomized] 
 
1. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 300 euros 
 
2. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 500 euros 
 
3. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 350 euros and the other subject wins 500 euros 
 
4. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 450 euros and the other subject wins 500 euros 
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5. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 0 euros 
 
6. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 800 euros 
 
7. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 350 euros and the other subject wins 800 euros 
 
8. Your choice: 
(a) you win 400 euros and the other subject wins 400 euros 
(b) you win 450 euros and the other subject wins 800 euros. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Does Experience Affect Fairness and Reciprocity in Lab Experiments?
  
 
 
 
Abstract. One of the most common criticisms about the external validity of lab experiments in 
economics concerns the representativeness of subjects usually considered in these studies. The ever-
increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centres in university campuses 
produced a peculiar category of participants: Students with high level of laboratory experience built 
through repeated participations in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the experience 
accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behavior in a set of representative simple games used to study 
social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). 
Our main finding shows how subjects having a high level of experience in lab experiments do not 
behave in a significantly different way from novices.  
 
 
Keywords: Experimental Methodology, External Validity, Subjects’ Experience, Lab Experiment. 
JEL codes: D03, D83, C91, C92.  
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3.1 Introduction  
Since its first appearance, experimental analysis of economic behavior has provoked sceptical 
reactions and criticisms. One of the major aims of the critics has always been the external validity of 
laboratory results. In particular, a reason behind the lack of generalizability of the conclusions obtained 
in the lab is associated with the predominant use of students as experimental subjects. The extensive 
use of pools of students, in fact, may generate problems related to their intrinsic characteristics (the 
majority of them are college students
24
 coming from western industrialized, rich and democratic 
countries
25
 – WEIRD) but the voluntary basis of the enrolment process, may also produce self-selection 
that in turn may lead to the formation of experimental pools with peculiar characteristics
26
.  
A further potential source of bias arises from the combined effect of ‘location’ and ‘number’: 
given the prevalent location of labs in university campuses
27
 and the ever-increasing number of 
experiments run in each of these labs, in fact, subjects tend to accumulate laboratory experience 
through repeated participation in experimental sessions (Friedman and Cassar, 2004).  
In this paper we investigate whether having a long record of participations in experimental 
sessions (H types – participations 15 ) alters subjects’ behavior in a set of representative experimental 
games on fairness and reciprocity with respect to a benchmark group made by subjects with low 
experience (L types – 1  participations 5 ) in laboratory experiments. We fail to observe any 
systematic behavioral difference between the two groups. 
The role of experience in economic experiments has been largely neglected, with few notable 
exceptions: Harrison et al. (1987) and Benson and Faminov (1988) discussing IO experiments, Marwell 
and Ames (1980), Isaac et al. (1984) and Bolton (1991) in bargaining games experiments and more 
recently, Matthey and Regner (2013), Conte et al. (2014), Capraro and Cococcioni (2015) and Xue et 
al. (2015). The first two papers document that highly experienced players are more effective as 
monopolists and are more capable at achieving profitable tacit collusion than inexperienced ones. 
Marwell and Ames (1980) and Isaac et al. (1984) both consider public good games situations and find 
no significant differences due to the different level of experience of participants. Bolton (1991) finds a 
similar negative result in an experiment involving alternating-offer bargaining.  
                                                          
24
 See Cooper et al. (1999); Peterson (2001); Fehr and List, (2004); Carpenter et al. (2005); Bellemare and Kroger (2007; 
Danielson and Holm, (2007); Carpenter et al., 2008; Alatas et al.  (2009); Belot et al. (2010); Cappelen et al. (2015); 
Anderson et al. (2013); Fréchette (2015). 
25
 Henrich et al. (2010). 
26
 See Eckel and Grossman (2000); Falk et al. (2010); Cleave et al. (2012); Exadaktylos et al. (2013); among others. 
27
 According to the list drafted by Laboratoire Montpelliérain d´Economie Théorique et Appliquée’s, only 2 out of 173 
experimental economics labs in the world are not located in university campus and only one is independent and not related 
to academic activities (http://leem.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/).    
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The more recent contributions of Matthey and Regner (2013) explore whether subjects’ 
experience spills over between experiments. Their meta-analysis considers data from four different 
studies and their results show that subjects with a higher number of participations tend to be less 
generous in allocation decisions. However this holds true only if participations in experiments that 
involved games similar to those used in the four studies are considered. Frequency in participation per 
se in laboratory sessions is not taken into account. On the other hand, Conte et al. (2014) focus 
specifically on the effect of ‘experience’ and ‘history’. ‘Experience’ measures the level of previous 
participation in public goods games experiments, while ‘history’ denotes previous participations in 
experiments involving different games. They find that at the aggregate level, subjects with ‘experience’ 
contribute smaller amounts, expect that other players contribute less and hold more accurate beliefs 
when compared with subjects without it. They show that also ‘history’ influences subjects’ behavior 
although less than ‘experience’.  
Focusing on cooperation in one-shot interaction, Capraro and Cococcioni (2015) analyse the 
history-dependent dynamic process. Many experimental studies suggest that cooperative decision-
making in one-shot interactions is most likely a history-dependent dynamic process. They run a 
standard two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma in which participants are randomly assigned to either of two 
conditions: (i) Time pressure condition which measures intuitive cooperation and (ii) time delay 
condition which measures deliberate cooperation. Their main findings show that promoting intuition 
versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behavior among inexperienced subjects playing in a 
non-cooperative setting and that experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but 
only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an 
instinctive impulse.  
Xue et al. (2015) replicate and extend a simple riskless choice experiment originally devised by 
Hochman et al. (2014). One of their five hypotheses concerns the possible role of experience. They test 
whether participants with greater experience in experiments will have higher maximization rates in 
prepayment treatments. Their results show that individuals who have been participating in many 
economics experiments before do not choose differently than those who are novices. 
Our contribution enriches the current state of the literature and departs from the most relevant 
contributions (Matthey and Regner, 2013; Conte at al., 2014; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2015), in two 
main respects: First, Matthey and Regner (2013), run a meta-analysis of four previous studies using 
dictator, ultimatum and mini-trust games; on the other hand Conte at al. (2014) and Capraro and 
Cococcioni (2015) run a proper experiment but focusing only on public good games and Prisoner’s 
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Dilemma, respectively. We, on the contrary, design and run a controlled experiment considering a 
richer set of different games. Second, our contribution differs as far as the quantitative definition of 
‘experience’ is concerned. We denote, in fact, subjects in our pool as experienced only if they have a 
considerable large number of lab participations (at least fifteen). Matthey and Regner (2013) consider 
subjects with at most thirteen participations, Conte et al. (2014) define as experienced subjects with at 
least another participation in experiment with a public good game or a prisoner’s dilemma. In Capraro 
and Cococcioni (2015) there is no hard information about the actual number of participations in 
experiments but a self-reported measure of experience: Participants are asked to answer to what extent 
they have previously participated in other studies like that (e.g., exchanging money with strangers), 
using a 5 points Likert-scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Several times’: a subject was considered inexperienced if 
he or she answered ‘never’. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 the experimental procedures 
are described. Section 3.3 provides specific details about the games and their parametrization. In 
Section 3.4 the testable hypotheses are derived. Section 3.5 presents the statistical analyses and the 
main result. Section 3.6 reports further results generated by two side-manipulations. Section 3.7 
concludes.  
 
3.2 Experimental Procedures 
Our main goal is to investigate the effect of a high level of experience in lab experiments on 
decision-making in simple representative experimental games focusing on fairness and reciprocity. 
Exploiting data stored in the recruitment ORSEE system (Greiner, 2015) of the University of Cologne, 
by design we recruited both high experience subjects (H types), that is, individuals with at least 15 
participations in experiments and low experience subjects (L types), namely, individuals having 
between 1 and 5 previous participations
28
. These two clusters have been chosen by design in order to 
assure, on one hand, (i) an adequate number of subjects in each group and, on the other hand, (ii) a 
sharp difference in the level of individual experience between the two groups. 
In our main experimental condition (C1)
29
 each participant is asked to make his/her decisions in 
four standard experimental games without receiving any information about the level of lab experience 
                                                          
28 
Subjects having no experience at all have not been recruited. Since this category of subjects is totally inexperienced with 
lab experiments, this might be a cause for naïve outcomes as these subjects are often times stressed by the completely new 
environment they are exposed to, and they are not familiar with the standard procedures. 
29
 Further side-manipulation, C2 and C3 are reported in section 6. 
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of the counterpart
30
 he/she is randomly re-matched with in the different games (perfect stranger 
matching). In practice the simple fact of having accumulated high experience (H types) vs low 
experience (L types) represents the main experimental variable.  
We elicited individual behavior in four games: Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, 
and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game31. In the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game and Trust Game, all the 
subjects played both roles A (dictator/proposer/trustor) and role B (receiver/responder/trustee) in a 
strategy-method fashion, and subsequent stages were not announced in advance. 
In order to implement an incentive-compatible payment mechanism at the end of each 
experimental session, only one game and one decision in each session were randomly selected and the 
corresponding payoff was paid in cash. If Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game and Trust Game were 
randomly selected for the payments, a random assignment determined which one of the members of the 
matched couple must be actually considered as player in role A, the other one is considered as player in 
role B. A’s action (Dictator/Proposer/Trustor) is then implemented. Finally, if the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
was randomly selected for the payments, players’ actions were implemented.  
All subjects received 2.50 Euros as show-up fee and got an average experimental payment of 
7.50 Euros for a 45 minutes lab session including post-experimental surveys and debriefing. The 
exchange rate between ECU and Euros was 6 ECU=1 Euro. Six experimental sessions were conducted 
on January 15
th
 and 16
th
 2015 at the University of Cologne
32
. The experimental protocol was 
implemented using the Bonn Experiment System (Seithe, 2012) (Screenshot 1A-B). A double blind 
anonymity procedure (subject vs subject and subject vs experimenters) was maintained during and after 
the experiment both about the participants’ decisions and the payments. No feedback or results were 
received by participants before the end of the session. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 In the debriefing questionnaire, it is asked to self-report about the number of experiments subjects had already 
participated in the past. The correlation between this self-reported measure and the actual record provided by ORSEE is 
0.89. This shows how subjects are quite aware about their own individual level of experience in laboratory experiments.  
31
 The logical sequence “Dictator Game Ultimatum Game  Trust Game”, moving from the baseline case (DG) to the 
more sophisticated (TG) interaction, it is implemented in order to favour the comprehension of the games and to avoid 
confusion. The Prisoner’s dilemma game is placed at the end of sequence in order to reduce priming effect and because of 
the different nature of its dynamics.  
32
 The instructions are provided in the Appendix B. 
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Screenshot 1 (A-B). Screen shots of the computer interface. 
 
Screenshot 1A 
 
Screenshot 1B 
3.3 The Games 
We elicited individual behavior in four games: Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, 
and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game and Trust Game, all the 
subjects played both role A (dictator/proposer/trustor) and role B (receiver/responder/trustee) in a 
strategy-method fashion, and subsequent stages were not announced in advance. 
 In Table 1 (A/B) the main parameters of the games are specified and summarized. 
In the Dictator Game, dictator A is endowed with 100 ECU. She is asked to send any amount between 
0 and 100 (in steps of 10) to receiver B who gets such amount.  
In the first stage of the Ultimatum Game, each subject first plays the role of proposer A. 
Proposer A is endowed with 100 ECU. She is asked to send any amount of it between 0 and 100 (in 
steps of 10) to responder B who gets such amount. If B accepts the offer, the two subjects share the 
endowment as proposed by player A. If B rejects the share offered by A, the entire endowment goes 
back to the experimenter and the subjects would get 0 ECU each. 
In the second stage, each subject plays the strategy method – whether to accept or not offers of 0-10-
20-30-40-50-60-70-80-90-100 ECU – for the role of responder B.  
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In the first stage of the Trust Game, each subject first plays the role of trustor A. Trustor A is 
endowed with 50 ECU. She is asked to send any amount of it between 0 and 50 (in steps of 10) to 
trustee B. The amount transferred by the trustor A to the trustee B is multiplied by a factor of 3 by the 
experimenter and sent to B. In the second stage, each subject plays the strategy method for the role of 
trustee B stating the amount returned to A in the different cases in which she gets 30-60-90-120-150 
ECU.  
Finally, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma there are two players and each of them has two possible 
actions: cooperating or defecting. In order to play the game, both players simultaneously choose one of 
two actions. The key feature of such game is that for each player, the choice to defect has a higher 
payoff regardless of the choice made by the other player. That is, we used the classic form of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma where cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, so that the only Nash equilibrium is for 
all players to defect. Their earnings depend on both players’ actions: if both players decide to cooperate 
both of them get 60 ECU; if both players decide to defect both of them get 40 ECU; and if one of two 
players chooses to defect and the other chooses to cooperate, their earnings will be 90 ECU and 30 
ECU respectively.  
For all the different games, control questions are administrated in order to tests the full 
comprehension of each game (see Appendix B). 
 
Table 3.1 (A/B): Parametrization of the games 
Table 3.1 A Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game and Trust Game 
 
 
 
Dictator Game Ultimatum Game Trust Game
Endowment role A
100 ECU 100 ECU 50 ECU
Endowment role B
0 ECU 0 ECU 0 ECU
Efficiency rate x3
Role A  Role B 0-100 ECU 0-100 ECU 0-50 ECU
(steps of 10) (steps of 10) (steps of 10)
Role B  Role A Accept/Reject 0-150 ECU
*strategy method (steps of 10)
*strategy method
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Table 3.1 B. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 
 
3.4 Testable Hypotheses  
 According to Friedman and Cassar (2004), subjects’ behavior changes over time as they get 
used to the experimental setting. This fact represents an issue both in terms of intra-session learning 
and inter-sessions experience accumulation. As far as it regards intra-session learning, Binmore and 
Shaked (2010) observe how the fact of getting used to the experimental setting leads the subjects to 
converge to behavioral patterns closer to the ‘homo economicus’ ones. Nevertheless, it is not clear if 
this is also the case for inter-sessions experience accumulation in which subjects get used to the 
experimental setting by participating in several experimental sessions. Following Binmore’s rationale, 
and given our focus on fairness and reciprocity, we can derive the following testable hypotheses for the 
different games in object:  
 
hp.1: In the Dictator Game the average dictator’s offer for the H types is smaller than the average 
dictator’s offer for the L types. 
  
hp.2a: In the Ultimatum Game the average proposer’s offer for H types is smaller than the average 
proposer’s offer for L types.   
hp.2b: In the Ultimatum Game the minimum acceptance offer for H types responders is smaller than 
the minimum acceptance offer for the L types responders. 
 
hp.3a:  In the Trust Game the average trust rate for H types is smaller than the average trust rate for L 
types. 
hp.3b: In the Trust Game the average level of trustworthiness for H types trustees is smaller average 
level of trustworthiness for L types trustees.  
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
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hp.4: In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the defection rate is larger for H types subjects than the 
defection rate for L types. 
 
3.5 Results 
First, in Table 3.2 we summarize the characteristics of the participants. We enrolled a total of 
134 subjects (77 female and 57 male), aged on average 25 and balanced for the level of laboratory 
experience: 67 H type subjects (min 15, max 86 previous participations in experiments, avg. 31) and, 
67 L type subjects (min 1, max 5 previous participations in experiments, avg. 3). Data show that, apart 
for the degree of laboratory experience, the two pools are fairly homogeneous. 
In this section we discuss the effect of a high experience level exerts on individuals’ choices with 
respect to a low experience level. 
In our main experimental condition (C1), where players have no information about the level of 
experience of the partner, any difference in behavior between H type subjects and L type subjects can 
be interpreted as the effect of subjects’ own level of experience. By comparing their choices in a 
between-subjects fashion, we can test the general hypothesis about whether experience, per se, 
systematically modifies subjects’ behavior.  
 
Table 3.2 Comparability of the two experimental groups 
 
 
H types L types  delta:  (H-L)
(n = 67) (n = 67) P-value
Experience, mean (min-max) 31.2 (15-86) 3.01 (1-5) 0
Female, # (%) 37 (55.2 %) 40 (59.7 %) 0.6
Age, mean (min-max) 25.7 (19-60) 24.1 (18-65) 0.14
Behavioural Economics classes, # 
(%)
12 (18 %) 11 (16.4 %) 0.82
Games Theory classes, # (%) 23 (34.4 %) 18 (26.9 %) 0.35
Characteristics
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3.5.1 Non-parametric analysis 
 Figures 3.1a-f plot participants’ behavior by subjects’ groups: H and L types. From a first 
visual inspection of the graphs, it turns to be quite evident that H and L types do not show different 
behavioral patterns in all the four different experimental games and this is confirmed by non-parametric 
tests. 
In the Dictator Game, out of a budget of 100 ECU, H types allocate on average 27.5 ECU to 
the counterpart, and L types allocate 31.1 ECU. The giving rates (hp.1) of the two different pools of 
subjects are statistically indistinguishable from each other at any conventional level (p=0.42, Two-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) (see fig. 1a). The average 1/3 giving rate observed in our 
experiment is in line with the consolidated result reported in the literature (Engel, 2011).  
In the Ultimatum Game, out of a budget of 100 ECU for player in role ‘A’, the average 
amount sent to ‘B’ is 39.6 ECU for H and 37.9 ECU for L types. The giving rates (hp.2a) of the two 
different pools of subjects are statistically indistinguishable from each other at any conventional level 
(p=0.45, Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) (see fig. 1c). The average proposers’ offers of about 
40% we observe in our ultimatum bargaining experiment are in line with the common results reported 
in the literature (Güth and Kocher, 2014). For the same game, the average minimum acceptable offer –
mao – for players in role ‘B’ is 29.3 ECU for H types and 26.6 ECU for L types. The minimum 
acceptable offers (hp.2b) - about 30% of the endowment - in the two different pools of subjects, are 
statistically indistinguishable from each other at any conventional level (p=0.31, Two-sided Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test) (see fig. 1d). Also in this case, the result meets the standard finding of the 
literature (Güth and Kocher, 2014). 
In the Trust Game, given the endowment of 50 ECU for player in role ‘A’, the average amount 
invested is 23.6 ECU for H types and 21.3 ECU for L types. The trust rates (hp.3a) of the two groups 
are statistically indistinguishable from each other at any conventional level (p=0.34, Two-sided 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) (see fig. 1e). The fact that on average subjects invest about 45% of their 
endowments is in line with the findings of the literature (Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Finally, the 
average return rate (hp.3b) in the same game equals to 0.196 for H types and to 0.229 for L types 
(p=0.28, Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) (see fig. 1f). 
In the Prisoner Dilemma the rate of defection is 57% for the H types and 63% for the L types. 
The defection rates (hp.4) in the two different pools of subjects are statistically indistinguishable from 
each other at any conventional level (p=0.50, χ2-test) (see fig. 1b). The average 60% defection rate we 
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observe in our experiment is consistent with the common results reported in the literature (Brosig, 
2002). 
These numbers show negligible differences between high and low experienced subjects for all 
the four games and the non-parametric analysis rejects any significant behavioral difference between H 
types and the benchmark group based on L types.  
See Table 3.4 for a summary of results of all games (C1). 
 
  
72 
 
Figures 3.1a-f Choices in the four games by experience levels 
           
Figure 3.1a: Dictator Game                                     Figure 3.1b: Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                  
        Figure 3.1c: Ultimatum Game (Proposer)                             Figure 3.1d: Ultimatum Game (Responder)           
              
             Figure 3.1e: Trust Game (Trustor)                                       Figure 3.1f: Trust Game (Trustee) 
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3.5.2 Regression Analysis 
 In order to check the robustness of the non-result delivered by the non-parametric analysis, 
Table 3.3 reports further OLS regression analyses  that allow to assess the differential effect caused 
by a high level of laboratory experience controlling for richer set of individual-specific factors that 
might influence the behavioral outcomes observed in the lab. 
Model (1) focuses on the Dictator Game: The offer in the dictator game represents the 
outcome variable. Models (2) and (3) address the Ultimatum Game: In model (2) the offer in the 
ultimatum game represents the outcome variable while in model (3) the minimum accepted offer – mao 
– is the outcome variable. Models (4) and (5) analyse individual choices in the Trust Game: In model 
(4) the outcome variable is the amount transferred by the trustee to the trustor while the mean return 
rate from trustor to the trustee is the dependent variable in model (5). In column (6) the propensity to 
defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is analysed. The outcome variable is the probability of defection 
in a linear probability model (all coefficients – by construction – can be interpreted as marginal 
effects). 
All these outcome variables are analysed at the light of our main experimental variable (H type 
dummy variable) as well as a set of individual-specific control variables that might influence the 
behavioral outcomes. H type is a dummy variable that identifies the high individual level of experience 
in lab experiments. Risk Attitude identifies the elicited individual level of risk-aversion considering 
the switch point from risky bets to safer ones in standard Holt and Laury (2002) test involving 15 pairs 
of lotteries. Experimental Economics Class is a dummy variable that identifies subjects that have 
been exposed to an experimental economics class. Game Theory Class is a further dummy variable 
that identifies subjects that have received training in game theory. Gender (male=1) is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the subject is a male. Age is self-reported in the post experimental 
questionnaire. Non-German nationality, since the vast majority of the experimental subjects are 
Germans, this dummy variable identifies the 13% of the subjects that declared a nationality other than 
the German. We also include Other Demographics mostly referred to the economic status of the 
subjects, living conditions and marital status.  
The OLS estimates for the H type dummy variable reject any statistically significant 
differential effect generated by a higher level of experience – with respect to the baseline group 
(Constant) of low experienced subjects (L types) – in all the different games and roles. Offers in the 
dictator game and in the ultimatum game seem to be marginally negatively affected by lower individual 
levels of risk attitude, but this negative effect is not detected when we focus on the public good 
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interaction or on the prisoner’s dilemma where – in principle – risk attitude should represent a more 
substantial issue.  
Training in game theory or in experimental economics does not systematically bias subjects’ 
behavior compared to baseline group of subjects who have not been exposed to such training. Males 
seem to be significantly more generous than females when transferring a share of their endowments 
to their counterparts in the ultimatum game and trust game. The opposite when we look males’ 
behavior in the ultimatum game. No clear gender-based pattern can be established. The age of the 
subjects, does not substantially affect the observed outcomes in all the different games. 
These regression analyses, taking into account a wider set of control variables that might affect 
the observed behavioral outcomes, confirms the non-result delivered by the non-parametric analysis: H 
types do not behave significantly differently with respect to L types. 
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Table 3.3. Behavioural outcomes (C1). OLS regressions. 
 
 
Notes: Three stars, two stars and one star for significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. The sample size relevant for the regression in column (4) is 132 instead of 134, because two subjects stated inconsistent 
choices in terms of minimum acceptance offer in the Ultimatum Game. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DG offer UG offer UG mao TG trust
TG avg. 
trustworth.
PD defection                  
OUTCOMES: (Hp.1) (Hp.2a) (Hp.2b) (Hp.3a) (Hp.3b) (Hp.4)
H type (Dummy) -3.789 2.041 3.378 3.145 -3.485 -0.078
(3.886) (2.302) (2.543) (2.904) (2.523) (0.09)
Risk Attitude -1.123** -0.755** 0.442 0.264 -0.352 -0.011
(0.509) (0.301) (0.335) (0.38) (0.33) (0.012)
Experimental Economics Class -1.785 1.142 6.347* -6.284 0.648 -0.166
(5.485) (3.248) (3.566) (4.099) (3.561) (0.127)
Game Theory Class -2.006 -1.337 1.065 1.507 0.547 0.064
(4.603) (2.726) (3.001) (3.44) (2.988) (0.107)
Gender (Male=1) -6.928* 4.277* 3.899 8.051*** 1.049 0.053
(3.943) (2.335) (2.6) (2.947) (2.56) (0.091)
Age -0.127 0.055 0.038 -0.489* 0.338 -0.001
(0.367) (0.217) (0.239) (0.274) (0.238) (0.009)
Non-German nationality -1.799 -6.919** -1.631 -2.246 -1.862 0.091
(5.588) (3.31) (3.628) (4.177) (3.628) (0.129)
Other Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 41.359*** 39.993*** 16.881** 30.437*** 18.816*** 0.887***
(10.431) (6.178) (6.772) (7.796) (6.772) (0.242)
Observations 134 134 132 134 134 134
R-squared 0.109 0.139 0.145 0.136 0.049 0.081
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3.6 Further manipulations 
In order to further enrich our comprehension about the effect of accumulated experience in 
lab experiments on subjects’ behavioral outcomes, two additional within-subject manipulations 
(condition C2 and condition C3) have been devised.  
While under the condition C1, subjects having different levels of experience were purely 
randomly paired, and no further information was given to them, in the two subsequent unannounced 
sets of interactions C2 and C3 – the ordering of this two side-manipulations was randomized while C1 
was always implemented at first in order to keep it totally independent from the other two variations
33– 
the following information concerning the level of experience of the counterpart was determined by 
design and revealed in the instructions for all the four games:  
 
C2: for H [L]: “…in this situation you will face a different counterpart who has a  
HIGH [LOW] level of experience. That is, a subject who has participated in many  
[in few] experiments”; 
 
C3: for H [L]: “…in this situation you will face a different counterpart who has a  
LOW [HIGH] level of experience. That is, a subject who has participated in few  
[in many] experiments”. 
 
In order to avoid multiple testing issues, in this section we rely only on regression analyses.  
As first step, the within-subject first-difference of the outcomes – computed contrasting each 
behavioral outcome in the main condition C1 against the corresponding action under the manipulated 
condition C2 – are assessed. The differential effect generated by the interaction between experienced 
subjects paired together (H: vs H), compared to baseline pairs of low experienced players (L: vs L) are 
captured by the coefficients for H type and the Constant, respectively.  
As second step, the same exercise is performed contrasting behavioral outcome in the main 
condition C1 against the corresponding action under the condition C3 in order to isolate the differential 
effect generated by high experience subjects interacting with low experienced ones (H: vs L) and vice 
versa (L: vs H). In both the cases, control variables are included in the regression analysis. 
 
                                                          
33 Sequences: i) C1 / C2 / C3;  ii) C1 / C3 / C2 . 
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3.6.1 C1 vs C2: Pairs with homogeneous levels of experience (H: vs H / L: vs L) 
Table 3.5 reports about the change of the behavior when subjects are informed that they are 
now interacting with an opponent having the same level of experience (condition C2) compared to the 
baseline behavior elicited under condition C1. For all games, the estimates of the Constant are not 
significant at any conventional statistical level. This means that the individual behavior of L types does 
not change when they are exposed to C2 compared to the baseline behavior pictured under the C1 
condition. 
Similarly, the coefficients for the dummy variable H type are not significant at any 
conventional, except for a marginal negative effect (p-value=0.06) detected for the Minimum 
Acceptable Offer in the Ultimatum game. The general pattern across games, shows how highly 
experienced subjects do not behave differently from less experienced ones.  
The control variables do not show any consistent pattern of significant effects on subjects’ 
behavior.  
 
3.6.2 C1 vs C3: Pairs with heterogeneous levels of experience (H: vs L / L: vs H) 
Table 3.6 reports about the change of the behavior when subjects are informed that they are 
now interacting with an opponent having a different level of experience (condition C3) compared to the 
baseline behavior elicited under condition C1. For all games, the estimates of the Constant are not 
significant at any conventional statistical level. This means that the individual behavior of low 
experienced subjects does not change when they are exposed to C3 compared to the baseline behavior 
pictured under condition C1. 
Similarly, the coefficients for the dummy variable H type are not significant at any 
conventional. Also in this third case, this shows how highly experienced subjects do not behave 
differently from less experienced ones.  
The control variables do not show any consistent pattern of significant effects on subjects’ 
behavior.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
The generalizability of conclusions drawn from lab experiments is still a debated issue in 
economics. It is of course a multifaceted problem that refers to many dimensions of the experimental 
practices and methods: the artificiality of the situations considered in the lab, the small size of the 
incentives, the lack of representativeness of the experimental subjects, are only few examples. In 
particular when we consider the reliability of the conclusions drawn from experiments involving 
convenience pool of students we should also ask whether the repeated participation into different 
experiments by these subjects might have a lasting effect on their behavioral tendencies in the lab. 
Were this to be true, in fact, experienced subjects would constitute an even less representative pool 
whose behavior patterns could not be reliably generalized. In this paper we addressed precisely this 
point. By design we investigated whether having repeatedly taken part in previous experiments 
consistently modifies individuals’ behavior in a set of widely used games focusing on fairness and 
reciprocity: Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. We 
considered a between-subjects design to compare the behavior of high experienced and low 
experienced subjects in the four games. Our data show that a high level of experience per se does not 
influence subjects’ behavior compared to a benchmark pool of low experienced subjects. 
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Table 3.4. Experience Effect. Summary and Results (all games - C1) 
 
 
  
Games Subjects Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max MWU - Z p-value
High 27.5 22.6 30 0 80
Low 31.1 20.6 40 0 60
Ultimatum
Game
Proposer Low 37.9 10.4 40 0 100
Ultimatum High 29.3 13.9 30 0 50
Game 
MAO 
Responder
Low 26.6 14.7 30 0 50
High 23.6 16.2 20 0 50
Low 21.3 16.6 20 0 50
Trust 
Game 
Trustee
High 19.6 12.7 23.3 0 42
% 
Average 
resent
Low 22.9 13.4 27.1 0 50
   Notes : Columns (8) and (9) are the results of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Nonparametric test.
Games Subjects
Defection 
Share
Std. Dev Median Min Max Χ2 p-value
Prisoner’s High 0.57 0.5 1 0 1
Dilemma Low 0.63 0.49 1 0 1
   Notes: Columns (8) and (9) are the results of Chi-square test, Pearson chi2(1).
0.496 0.481
0.307
Trust 
Game 
Trustor
-0.946 0.344
1.072 0.283
Dictator 
Game
0.815 0.415
High 39.6 10.4 40
-0.755 0.45
-1.022
10 60
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Table 3.5. Within-subject first-differences of the outcomes: (C1 - C2). OLS regressions. 
 
 
Notes: Three stars, two stars and one star for significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  The sample size relevant for the regression in column (4) is 131 instead of 134, because three subjects stated inconsistent 
choices in terms of minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  C1-C2   C1-C2   C1-C2   C1-C2   C1-C2   C1-C2   C1-C2
OUTCOMES: DG offer UG offer UG mao TG trust
TG avg. 
trustworth.
PD Defection
H type 0.971 -0.619 -3.331* -0.047 1.071 0.073
[H: vs H] (3.405) (2.334) (1.749) (1.913) (1.345) (0.075)
Risk Attitude -0.148 -0.530* -0.37 -0.216 0.07 -0.004
(0.446) (0.306) (0.23) (0.25) (0.176) (0.01)
Experimental Economics Class -0.146 5.394 -0.498 2.216 2.097 -0.075
(4.806) (3.294) (2.446) (2.7) (1.898) (0.105)
Game Theory Class -0.079 1.467 4.613** 0.779 1.005 0.003
(4.034) (2.765) (2.061) (2.266) (1.593) (0.089)
Gender (Male=1) -2.969 1.08 1.713 2.291 -2.602* -0.027
(3.455) (2.368) (1.787) (1.941) (1.365) (0.076)
Age 0.971 -0.619 -3.331* -0.047 1.071 0.073
(3.405) (2.334) (1.749) (1.913) (1.345) (0.075)
Non-German nationality 0.305 -0.969 5.191** 3.92 -2.212 -0.175
(4.897) (3.356) (2.49) (2.75) (1.934) (0.107)
Other Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant  7.9 0.571 1.966 1.102 -4.537 0.33
[L: vs L] (9.141) (6.266) (4.648) (5.134) (3.61) (0.201)
Observations 134 134 131 134 134 134
R-squared 0.026 0.09 0.131 0.051 0.137 0.071
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Table 3.6. Within-subject first-differences of the outcomes: (C1 - C3). OLS regressions. 
 
Notes: Three stars, two stars and one star for significant level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  The sample size relevant for the regression in column (4) is 132 instead of 134, because two subjects stated inconsistent 
choices in terms of minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  C1-C3   C1-C3   C1-C3   C1-C3   C1-C3   C1-C3   C1-C3
OUTCOMES: DG offer UG offer UG mao TG trust
TG avg. 
trustworth.
PD defection    
High type -1.694 0.433 -0.82 3.281 1.329 -0.062
[H: vs L] (3.709) (2.57) (1.577) (2.156) (1.608) (0.09)
Risk Attitude -0.238 -0.622* -0.034 0.144 0.024 -0.003
(0.485) (0.336) (0.207) (0.282) (0.211) (0.012)
Experimental Economics Class -1.442 5.998 3.313 1.617 1.461 0.016
(5.234) (3.627) (2.211) (3.043) (2.27) (0.126)
Game Theory Class 0.977 -1.846 0.329 0.45 3.828** 0.135
(4.393) (3.044) (1.861) (2.554) (1.905) (0.106)
Gender (Male=1) -5.148 0.573 1.273 3.916* -0.591 0.134
(3.763) (2.607) (1.613) (2.188) (1.632) (0.091)
Age -0.17 -0.002 0.041 -0.124 0.174 -0.003
(0.35) (0.243) (0.148) (0.204) (0.152) (0.008)
Non-German nationality 4.155 1.03 1.314 1.028 -3.286 -0.058
(5.333) (3.695) (2.25) (3.1) (2.313) (0.129)
Other Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant  11.789 5.319 -2.242 0.515 -2.587 -0.075
[L: vs H] (9.955) (6.898) (4.2) (5.788) (4.317) (0.24)
Observations 134 134 132 134 134 134
R-squared 0.036 0.078 0.043 0.071 0.106 0.05
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. The aim of this study is to investigate how people 
make decisions in particular situations. Feel free to ask questions at any time before the session begins, we will 
answer you privately. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with 
other participants is prohibited. Decisions have to be made individually and in private.  
This is not a test, so there are no right or wrong answers. Just think about what is best for you and act 
accordingly. Your decisions will be strictly anonymous and could not be linked to you in any way. The data 
collected will be used only for scientific purposes and stored for the duration of this study. At the end of the 
session one of situations will be randomly selected and you will be paid in cash according to the choice you 
made in that particular situation (the rules of the specific situation are explained in details below). You will also 
receive you € 2.5 as show-up fee. Note that in each situation, you will be paired with a different person. You will 
not be told to whom you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you 
are either during or after the experiment. The experiment involves three phases, and overall, it will last 
approximately 60 minutes. 
 
Phase 1 [Main experimental condition C1] 
In this part of the experiment you will be paired in each situation with a different person who will also get a 
reward that will depend on you choice or on the combination of your and his/her own choice. You will not be 
told to whom you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he/she will not be told who you are either 
during or after the experiment.  
 
Situation 1 
In this task there are two subjects: Person A and Person B. Person A has to decide what portion, if any, of 100 
experimental points he/she wants to transfer to Person B. Person B does not have any decision to make, the final 
distribution of points depends only on Person A. If Person A transfers 0 points to Person B, Person A keeps all 
his/her endowment of 100 experimental points and Person B will get 0 points; if Person A transfers 10 points to 
Person B, Person A will get 90 points and Person B 10, and so on. You will play the role of Person A and Person 
B. At the end we will randomly pick one of the two roles and, if this game will be selected, you will be paid 
accordingly.  
Now you are Person A. Your decision is a simple one: what portion, if any, of 100 experimental points, you want 
to transfer to Person B? Remember, your choice can be anywhere from 0 to 100, in 10 points increments (points 
will be converted in cash: 6 experimental points = €1). 
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Now it is time to make your decision. 
How much do you want transfer to Person B? [ ___ ] 
 
Situation 2 
There are two players in this game: ‘YOU’ and the ‘Other’ player. Each of you has two options: Action C and 
Action D. In order to play the game, both of you simultaneously choose one of your actions. Remember your 
earnings depend both on your choice and the other player’s choice. Your choices will give you the chance to get 
a certain number of experimental points that will be converted in money (6 experimental points = €1). If you and 
the other player play C, both of you will get 60 experimental points; if you play C and the other player plays D, 
you will get 30 points and the other player will get 90 points; if you and the other player play D, both of you will 
get 40 points; if you play D and the other player plays C, you will get 90 experimental points and the other 
player will get 30 points. 
The table below summarizes the game (players, actions and payoffs). Your payoffs are indicated before the 
comma, other’s payoff after. 
 
 
 
Control Questions 
Now verify if you have understood the game. If the other player plays D and you play C: 
 - You get... 
- Other player gets...  
If the other player plays C and you play D: 
- You get... 
- Other player gets...  
 
Which action would you like to play, Action C or Action D?     __ 
 
 
 
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
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Situation 3 
There are two players in this game: Person A and Person B. Person A has 100 experimental points as initial 
endowment and he/she must decide how much to send to Person B. In turn, person B may accept or reject Person 
A’s offer. If Person B accepts, he/she gets the money that Person A sent, and Person A keeps the remaining 
points (100 minus the amount sent); if Person B rejects Person A’s offer, both get nothing (0 points). Example: if 
Person A sends 10 points to Person B and Person B rejects that offer, Both A and B get nothing; if Person B 
accepts Person A’s offer, he/she will get 10 points and Person A 90 (100 minus 10). You will make decisions 
both as Person A and as Person B.  
You will play both the role of Person A and Person B. At the end we will randomly pick one of the two roles 
and, if this game will be selected, you will be paid accordingly. 
Now you are Person A. Your decision is a simple one: how many, if any, of 100 experimental points you want to 
transfer to Person B? Remember, your choice can be anywhere from 0 to 100, in 10 points increments (points 
will be converted in cash: 6 experimental points = €1). 
 
Control questions. 
Now verify if you have understood the game.  
You are Person A and assume that your initial endowment is 10 points. 
 1. You send to Person B 3 points. Person B accepts your offer. How much do you get? 
- You get… 
- Person B gets… 
2. You send to Person B 4 points. Person B rejects your offer. How much do you get? 
- You get… 
- Person B gets… 
 
You are Person B and assume that initial endowment of Person A is 10 points. 
3. Person A sends you 2 points. You reject that offer.  How much do you get? 
 - You get… 
 - Person A gets… 
4. Person A sends you 4 points. You accept the offer. How much do you get? 
- You get… 
- Person A gets… 
 
You are Person A. Your initial endowment is 100 experimental points.  
How much of your initial endowment do you want to send to Person B (in 10 points increments)?  
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___ 
You are Person B. Initial endowment of person A is 100 experimental points. Person A sends you: 
- 0, do you accept or reject?  [ YES / NO ] 
- 10, do you accept or reject? [ YES / NO]       
- 20, do you accept or reject? [ YES / NO ]         
- 30, do you accept or reject? [ YES / NO ]        
- 40, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 50, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 60, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 70, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 80, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO] 
- 90, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 100, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
 
Situation 4 
There are two players in this game: Person A and Person B. Person A has 50 experimental points as initial 
endowment and he/she have to decide how much of this amount, if any, he/she wants to send to person B. Person 
B will receive that amount multiplied by 3. For instance, if Person A sends 10 points to Person B, Person B will 
receive 30 points; if Person A sends 20 points, Person B will receive 60 points, and so on. In turn, Person B will 
have to decide how much of amount received, if any, he/she wants to send back to Person A. You will make 
decisions both as Person A and as Person B. If this situation will be drawn to be paid at the end of this session, 
we will pay you for one of two roles (A or B), selected randomly (6 experimental points = €1). Person A’s 
earnings will be equal to: initial endowment minus (-) no. points sent to Person B plus (+) points received back 
by Person B. Person B’s earnings will be equal to: points sent by Person A multiplied by 3 minus (-) points sent 
back to person A.  
 
Control questions. 
Now verify if you have understood the game.  
You are Person A and suppose that your initial endowment is 10 points. 
1. If you send 3 points to Person B, how much does person B get?  
- Person B gets...  
2. If you send 4 points to Person B and Person B re sends you 0, how much do you get?  
 - You get... 
- Person B gets...  
 
Now you are Person B and suppose that initial endowment of person A is 10 points. 
3. Person A sends you 2 points, how much do you receive?  
- You get... 
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4. Person A sends you 5 points and you re-send 0 points, how much do you get?  
- You get... 
- Person A gets... 
 
You are Person A and your initial endowment is 50 experimental points.   
How much of your initial endowment of 50 experimental points do you want to send to Person B (in 10 
points increments)? ___ 
You are Person B and the initial endowment of Person A is 50 experimental points. If Person A sends you: 
- 10 (so you receive 30). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 20 (so you receive 60). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 30 (so you receive 90). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 40 (so you receive 120). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 50 (so you receive 150). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
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Phase 2 – [C2 condition] 
As in condition C1 plus information about the other player’s level of experience (same level) 
Now starts a new phase of the experiment.  
(for Low types) 
You have a LOW level of experience in laboratory, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this 
part of the experiment you will be paired in each situation with a different person who has your same level of 
experience and who will also get a reward that will depend on your own choice or both of you choices, 
depending on the situation. You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment and he 
or she will not be told who you are either during or after the experiment.  
Control questions. 
Your level of experience is... 
The level of experience of your partner is... 
 
(for High types) 
You have an HIGH level of experience in laboratory, that is, you have already participated in many experiments 
and, in this part of the experiment you will be paired in each situation with a different person who has your same 
level of experience and, who will also get a reward that will depend on your own choice or both of you choices, 
depending on the situation. You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and 
he or she will not be told who you are either during or after the experiment.  
Control questions. 
Your level of experience is... 
The level of experience of your partner is... 
 
Situation 1 
 
(for Low types) 
As you know, you have a LOW level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few 
experiments and, in this situation you will have to face Person B who has a LOW level of experience as 
well. 
In this task there are two subjects: Person A and Person B. Person A has to decide what portion, if any, of 100 
experimental points he/she wants to transfer to Person B. Person B does not have any decision to make, the final 
distribution of points depends only on Person A. If Person A transfers 0 points to Person B, Person A keeps all 
his/her endowment of 100 experimental points and Person B will get 0 points; if Person A transfers 10 points to 
Person B, Person A will get 90 points and Person B 10, and so on. You will play the role of Person A and Person 
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B. At the end we will randomly pick one of the two roles and, if this game will be selected, you will be paid 
accordingly.  
Now you are Person A. Your decision is a simple one: what portion, if any, of 100 experimental points, you want 
to transfer to Person B? Remember, your choice can be anywhere from 0 to 100, in 10 points increments (points 
will be converted in cash: 6 experimental points = €1). 
Now it is time to make your decision. How much do you want transfer to Person B? ___ 
 
(for High types) 
As you know, you have a HIGH level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many 
experiments and, in this situation you will have to face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience as 
well.  
In this task there are two subjects: Person A and Person B. Person A has to decide what portion, if any, of 100 
experimental points he/she wants to transfer to Person B. Person B does not have any decision to make, the final 
distribution of points depends only on Person A. If Person A transfers 0 points to Person B, Person A keeps all 
his/her endowment of 100 experimental points and Person B will get 0 points; if Person A transfers 10 points to 
Person B, Person A will get 90 points and Person B 10, and so on. You will play the role of Person A and Person 
B. At the end we will randomly pick one of the two roles and, if this game will be selected, you will be paid 
accordingly.  
Now you are Person A. Your decision is a simple one: what portion, if any, of 100 experimental points, you want 
to transfer to Person B? Remember, your choice can be anywhere from 0 to 100, in 10 points increments (points 
will be converted in cash: 6 experimental points = €1). 
Now it is time to make your decision. How much do you want transfer to Person B? ___ 
 
Situation 2 
There are two players in the game: you and another player you are paired with.  
 
(for Low types) 
You have LOW experience and the other player has LOW experience as well. 
Now look the table below and make your decision. As you know, you have a LOW level of laboratory 
experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to face a player 
with a LOW level of experience as well. 
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Which action would you like to play, Action C or Action D?     __ 
 
 
(for High types) 
You have HIGH experience and the other player has HIGH experience as well. 
Now look the table below and make your decision. As you know, you have a HIGH level of laboratory 
experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have to face a 
player with HIGH level of experience as well. 
 
 
Which action would you like to play, Action C or Action D?     __ 
 
Situation 3 
There are two players in the game: Person A and Person B. 
(for Low types) 
Person A has LOW experience and person B has LOW experience as well. 
(for High types) 
Person A has HIGH experience and person B has HIGH experience as well. 
 
 
 
 
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
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(for Low types) 
You are Person A. Your initial endowment is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a LOW level of 
laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a LOW level of experience as well.  
How much of your initial endowment do you want to send to Person B (in 10 points increments)?  
 
(for High types) 
You are Person A. Your initial endowment is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a HIGH level of 
laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience as well.  
How much of your initial endowment do you want to send to Person B (in 10 points increments)?  
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person B. Initial endowment of person A is 100 experimental points. 
As you know, you have a LOW level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments 
and in this situation you will have to face Person A who has a LOW level of experience as well. Person A sends 
you: 
- 0, do you accept or reject?  [YES / NO] 
- 10, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]       
- 20, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 30, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 40, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 50, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 60, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 70, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 80, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO] 
- 90, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 100, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
 
(for High types) 
You are Person B. Initial endowment of person A is 100 experimental points. 
As you know, you have a HIGH level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many 
experiments and in this situation you will have to face Person A who has a HIGH level of experience as well. 
Person A sends you: 
- 0, do you accept or reject?  [YES / NO] 
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- 10, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]       
- 20, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 30, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 40, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 50, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 60, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 70, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 80, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO] 
- 90, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 100, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
 
Situation 4 
There are two players in the game: Person A and Person B. 
 
(for Low types) 
Person A has LOW experience and person B has LOW experience as well. 
 
(for High types) 
Person A has HIGH experience and person B has HIGH experience as well. 
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person A and your initial endowment is 50 experimental points.  As you know, you have a LOW level 
of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a LOW level of experience as well. 
How much of your initial endowment of 50 experimental points do you want to send to Person B (in 10 
points increments)? 
 
(for High types) 
You are Person A and your initial endowment is 50 experimental points.  As you know, you have a HIGH level 
of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have 
to face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience as well.  
How much of your initial endowment of 50 experimental points do you want to send to Person B (in 10 
points increments)? 
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(for Low types) 
You are Person B and the initial endowment of Person A is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a 
LOW level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you 
will have to face Person A who has a LOW level of experience as well. If Person A sends you: 
- 10 (so you receive 30). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points ?__  
- 20 (so you receive 60). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 30 (so you receive 90). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 40 (so you receive 120). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 50 (so you receive 150). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
 
(for High types) 
You are Person B and the initial endowment of Person A is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a 
HIGH level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation 
you will have to face Person A who has a HIGH level of experience as well. If Person A sends you: 
- 10 (so you receive 30). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 20 (so you receive 60). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 30 (so you receive 90). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 40 (so you receive 120). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 50 (so you receive 150). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
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Phase 3 – [C3 condition] 
As in condition C1 plus information about the other player’s level of experience (different level). 
 
Now starts a new phase of the experiment.  
(for Low types) 
You have a LOW level of experience in laboratory, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this 
part of the experiment you will be paired in each situation with a different person who has HIGH level of 
experience, who will also get a reward that will depend on your own choice or both of you choices, depending 
on the situation. You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she 
will not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Control questions. 
Your level of experience is... 
The level of experience of your partner is... 
 
(for High types) 
You have a HIGH level of experience in laboratory, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in 
this part of the experiment you will be paired in each situation with a different person who has LOW level of 
experience, who will also get a reward that will depend on your own choice or both of you choices, depending 
on the situation. You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she 
will not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Control questions. 
Your level of experience is... 
The level of experience of your partner is... 
 
Situation 1 
 
(for Low types) 
As you know, you have a LOW level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments 
and, in this situation you will have to face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience, that is, a subject who 
has participated in many experiments. 
Now it is time to make your decision. How much do you want transfer to Person B? ___ 
 
(for High types) 
As you know, you have a HIGH level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in  
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many experiments and, in this situation you will have to face Person B who has a LOW level of experience, that 
is, a subject who has participated in few experiments. 
Now it is time to make your decision. How much do you want transfer to Person B? ___ 
 
Situation 2 
There are two players in the game: you and another player you are paired with.  
 
(for Low types) 
You have LOW experience and the other player has HIGH experience.  
Now look the table below and make your decision. As you know, you have a LOW level of laboratory 
experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to face a player 
with a HIGH level of experience, that is, a subject who has participated in many experiments. 
 
 
Which action would you like to play, Action C or Action D? ____ 
 
(for High types) 
You have HIGH experience and the other player has LOW experience. 
Now look the table below and make your decision. As you know, you have a HIGH level of laboratory 
experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have to face a 
player with a LOW level of experience, that is, a subject who has participated in few experiments. 
 
 
Which action would you like to play, Action C or Action D? ____ 
 
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate Defect
Other
You
60, 60 30, 90
90, 30 40, 40
Cooperate
Defect
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Situation 3 
There are two players in the game: Person A and Person B. 
 
(for Low types) 
Person A has LOW experience and person B has HIGH experience.  
 
(for High types) 
Person A has HIGH experience and person B has LOW experience. 
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person A. Your initial endowment is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a LOW level of 
laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in many experiments. 
How much of your initial endowment do you want to send to Person B (in 10 points increments)?  
 
(for High types) 
You are Person A. Your initial endowment is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a HIGH level of 
laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a LOW level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in few experiments. 
How much of your initial endowment do you want to send to Person B (in 10 points increments)?  
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person B. Initial endowment of person A is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a LOW 
level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and in this situation you will 
have to face Person A who has a HIGH level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in many experiments. 
Person A sends you: 
- 0, do you accept or reject?  [YES / NO] 
- 10, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]       
- 20, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 30, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 40, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 50, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 60, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 70, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 80, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO] 
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- 90, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 100, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
 
(for High types) 
You are Person B. Initial endowment of person A is 100 experimental points. As you know, you have a HIGH 
level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and in this situation you will 
have to face Person A who has a LOW level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in few experiments.  
Person A sends you: 
- 0, do you accept or reject?  [YES / NO] 
- 10, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]       
- 20, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 30, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 40, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 50, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 60, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]        
- 70, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 80, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO] 
- 90, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
- 100, do you accept or reject? [YES / NO]         
 
Situation 4 
There are two players in the game: Person A and Person B. 
 
(for Low types) 
Person A has LOW experience and person B has HIGH experience.  
 
(for High types) 
Person A has HIGH experience and person B has LOW experience. 
 
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person A and your initial endowment is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a LOW level of 
laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you will have to 
face Person B who has a HIGH level of experience that is, she/he has participated in many experiments.  
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How much of your initial endowment of 50 experimental points do you want to send to Person B (in 10 
points increments)? 
(for High types) 
You are Person A and your initial endowment is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a HIGH level 
of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation you will have 
to face Person B who has a LOW level of experience that is, she/he has participated in few experiments. 
How much of your initial endowment of 50 experimental points do you want to send to Person B (in 10 
points increments)? 
 
(for Low types) 
You are Person B and the initial endowment of Person A is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a 
LOW level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in few experiments and, in this situation you 
will have to face Person A who has a HIGH level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in many 
experiments. If Person A sends you: 
- 10 (so you receive 30). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
- 20 (so you receive 60). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
- 30 (so you receive 90). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
- 40 (so you receive 120). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 50 (so you receive 150). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
 
 
(for High types) 
You are Person B and the initial endowment of Person A is 50 experimental points. As you know, you have a 
HIGH level of laboratory experience, that is, you have participated in many experiments and, in this situation 
you will have to face Person A who has a LOW level of experience, that is, she/he has participated in few 
experiments. 
If Person A sends you: 
- 10 (so you receive 30). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
- 20 (so you receive 60). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 30 (so you receive 90). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __  
- 40 (so you receive 120). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
- 50 (so you receive 150). How many points do you send back in increments of 10 experimental points? __ 
 
98 
 
Bibliography 
 
Adair, J. G. (1984). The Hawthorne effect: A reconsideration of the methodological artifact. Journal of  
Applied Psychology, 69, 334-345. 
 
Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., and Gangadharan, L. (2009). Subject pool  
effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian 
students. Experimental Economics, 12(1), 113-132. 
 
Allen, J. S., and Muchinsky, P. M. (1984). Assessing raters’ policies in evaluating proposed services  
for transporting the physically handicapped. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69, 3-11. 
 
Anderson, J., Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J., Götte, L., Maurer, K., Nosenzo, D., Potter,  R., Rocha,  
K., and Rustichini, A. (2013). Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of 
other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two 
adult samples. Experimental Economics, 16 (2), 170-189. 
 
Arnett, J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American.  
American Psychologist, 63(7), 602-14. 
 
Bardsley, N. (2008). Dictator game giving: Altruism or artefact? Experimental Economics, 11, 122- 
133. 
 
Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moffatt, P., Starmer C., and Sugden R. (2010). Experimental  
Economics: Rethinking the Rules. Princeton University Press. 
 
Bassok, M., Wu, L. L., and Olseth K. L. (1995). Judging a book by its cover: interpretative effects of 
content on problem solving transfer. Memory and Cognition, 23, 354-67. 
 
Bellemare, C. and Kroger, S. (2007). On representative social capital. European Economic  
 Review, 51, 183–202. 
 
Belot, M., Duch, R. M., and Miller, L. M. (2010). Who Should be Called to the Lab? A  
comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games.  
http://cess-wb.nuff.ox.ac.uk/documents/DP2010/CESS_DP2010_001.pdf  
 
Benson, B. L., and Faminov, M. D., (1988). The impact of experience on prices and profits in  
experimental duopoly markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 9(4), 345-365. 
 
99 
 
Binmore, K. (1994). Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I. Cambridge MA: MIT  
Press. 
 
Bohnet, I., and Frey, B. (1999). Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games:  
comment. American Economic Review, 89, 335–339. 
 
Bolton, G. E. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence. American Economic  
Review, 81(5), 1096-1136. 
 
Bracht, J., and Regner, T. (2011). Moral emotions and partnership. Jena Economic Research Papers, 
2011-028. 
 
Brañas-Garza, P. (2006). Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 60, 306-320. 
 
Brosig, J. (2002).  Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s  
 dilemma game, Journal of Economic Behavior and  Organization, (47), 275–290. 
 
Burnham, T. C. (2003). Engineering altruism: A theoretical and experimental investigation of 
anonymity and gift giving. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50, 133-144. 
 
Calder, B. J., Phillips, L.W., and Tybout A. M. (1981). Design Research for Application. Journal of  
Consumer Research, 8, 197-207. 
 
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton  
Press. 
 
Camerer, C. F., and Hogarth, R. M. (1999). The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A  
review and capital-labor-production framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 7–42. 
 
Cappelen, A. W., Nygaard, K., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2015). Social Preferences in  
the Lab: A Comparison of Students and a Representative Population. The Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, 117(4), 1306-1326. 
 
Capraro, V., and Cococcioni, G. (2015). Social setting, intuition, and experience in lab experiments  
interact to shape cooperative decision-making. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological  
Sciences, 282(1811). 
 
Carbone, E. (2005). Demographics and Behaviour. Experimental Economics, 8(3), 217-232. 
 
Carlson, R. (1971). Where Is the Person in Personality Research? Psychological Bulletin, 75(3), 203-  
100 
 
219. 
 
Carpenter, J., Burks, S., and Verhoogen, E. (2005). Comparing students to workers: The effects  
of social framing on behavior in distribution games. In Field Experiments in Economics 
(Research in Experimental Economics), Carpenter, J., Harrison, G., List, J. (editors), 
JAI/Elsevier, Greenwich, CT, and London, 261–290. 
 
Carpenter, J., Connolly, C., and Myers, C. K. (2008). Altruistic Behavior in a Representative  
Dictator Experiment. Experimental Economics, 11, 282-298. 
 
Christensen-Szalanski, J. J. J., Beck, D. E., Christensen- Szalanski, C. M., and Koepsell, T. D. (1983).  
Effects of expertise and experience on risk judgments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, 278-
284. 
 
Churchill, N. C., and Cooper, W. W. (1971). Effects of auditing records: Individual task  
accomplishment and organizational objectives. In W. M. Evan (Ed.), Organizational 
experiments: Laboratory and field research. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
 
Cleave, B., Nikiforakis, N., and Slonim, R. (2011). Is there selection bias in laboratory  
experiments? The Case of Social and Risk Preferences. Experimental Economics, 16(3),  
372-382. 
 
Conte, A., Levati, M. V., and Montanari, N. (2014). Experience in Public Goods Experiments. 
http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2014_010.pdf.  
 
Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. H., Lo, W., and Gu, Q. L. (1999). Gaming against Managers in Incentive  
Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers. American 
Economic Review, 89(4), 781-804. 
 
Cornelius, E. T., DeNisi, A. S., and Blencoe, A. G. (1984). Expert and naïve raters using the PAQ:  
Does it matter? Personnel Psychology, 37, 453-464. 
 
Danielson, A. J. and Holm, H. J. (2007). Do You Trust Your Brethren? Eliciting Trust Attitudes and  
Trust Behavior in a Tanzanian Congregation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
62(2), 255–271. 
 
Davis, D. D., and Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton University Press. 
 
Eckel, C., and Grossman, P. (1996). Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic  
Behavior, 16, 181–191. 
 
Eckel, C., and Grossman P. (2000). Volunteers and Pseudo-Volunteers: The Effect of Recruitment  
101 
 
Method in Dictator Experiments. Experimental Economics, 3(2), 107-120. 
 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: a meta study. Experimental Economics, 14, 583-610. 
 
Exadaktylos, F., Espín, A. M., and Brañas-Garza, P. (2013). Experimental subjects are not  
different. Scientific Reports, 3, 1213.  
 
Falk, A., and Heckman J. J. (2009). Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social  
Sciences. Science, 326, 535-538. 
 
Falk, A., Meier, S., and Zehnder, C. (2010). Do Lab Experiments Misrepresent Social Preferences?  
The case of self-selected student samples. Journal of the European  Economic Association, 
11(4), 839-852. 
 
Fehr, E., and List J. A. (2004). The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives. Trust and Trustworthiness  
among CEOs. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5), 743-771. 
 
Fleming, J. E. (1969). Managers as subjects in business decision research. Academy of Management  
Journal, 12, 59-66. 
 
Fréchette, G. R. (2015). Laboratory Experiments: Professionals versus Students. In Handbook of  
Experimental Economic Methodology, Guillaume R. Fréchette and Andrew Schotter (editors), 
Oxford University Press, February, 360-390. 
 
Friedman, M. (1953). The Methodology of Positive Economics. In Essays in Positive Economics.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 3-43.  
 
Friedman, D., and Cassar, A. (2004) Economics Lab: An intensive course in experimental    
economics, Routledge, 2004. 
 
Gintis, H. (2001).The contribution of game theory to experimental design in the behavioral sciences. In  
Commentary/Hertwig & Ortmann: Experimental practices in economics: A challenge for 
psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 383-451. 
 
Gneezy, U., and Potters, J. (1997). An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 631- 645. 
 
Gordon, M. E., Slade, L. A., and Schmitt, N. (1986). The Science of the Sophomore Revised: From  
Conjecture to Empiricism. Academy of Management Review, 11(1), 191-207. 
 
Greenberg, J. (1987). The College Sophomore as Guinea Pig: Setting the Record Straight. Academy of  
Management Review, 12, 157-159. 
102 
 
Grether, D. M. (1980). Bayes rule as a description model: The representativeness heuristic. Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, 95, 537–557. 
 
Guala, F. (2005). The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Guala, F., and Mittone, L. (2005). Experiments in economics: External validity and the robustness of  
phenomena. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(4), 495-515. 
 
Guala, F., and Mittone, L. (2010). Paradigmatic experiments: The Dictator Game. The Journal of  
Socio-Economics, 39, 578–584. 
 
Guala, F. (2006). Filosofia dell’economia: modelli, casualità, previsione. Il Mulino. 
 
Guala, F. (2008). Experimentation in Economics. In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Uskali  
Mäki (editor), Elsevier, 597-640. 
 
Guillén, P., and Veszteg, R. F. (2006). Social Pool Bias in Economic Experiments.  
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers06_03.pdf.  
 
Guillén, P., and Veszteg, R. F. (2012). On “lab rats”. The Journal of Socio-Economics, (41), 714-720. 
 
Güth, W., Ploner, M., and Regner, T. (2009). Determinants of in-group bias: Is group affiliation  
mediated by guilt-aversion? Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 814–828. 
 
Güth, W., and Kocher M. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments:Motives, 
variations, and a survey of the recent literature, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, (108), 396-409. 
 
Haigh M. S. and List J. A. (2005). Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An  
Experimental Analysis. The Journal of Finance, 60(1, 523–534. 
 
Hakel, M. D., Dobmeyer, T. W., and Dunnette, M. D. (1970a). Relative importance of three content  
dimensions in overall suitability ratings of job applicants’ resumes. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 54, 65-71. 
 
Hakel M. D., Hollmann, T. D., and Dunnette, M. D. (1970b). Accuracy of interviewers, certified public  
accountants, and students in identifying the interests of accountants. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 54, 115-119. 
 
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an  
103 
 
anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256. 
 
Harless, D. W. and Camerer, C. F. (1994). The predictive utility of generalized expected utility  
theories. Econometrica, 62, 1251–1289. 
 
Harrison, G. W., McKee, M., and Rutström, E. E. (1987). Experimental evaluations of  
institutions of monopoly restraints. In Advances in Behavioral Economics, Green, L.,  
Kagel, J. H. (editors), Ablex Press, Norwood, N.J., 54-94. 
 
Harrison, G. W. (1989). Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions. American Economic Review  
79, 749–762.  
 
Harrison, G. W. (1992). Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: Reply. American Economic  
Review, 82, 1426–1443. 
 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr,  
A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, N. S., Hill, K., Gil-White, F., Gurven, M., Marlowe, F. W., Patton, 
J. Q., and Tracer, D. (2005). Economic man in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral 
experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), 795-815. 
 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world?   
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 61-83. 
 
Hertwig, R., and Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in Economics: A challenge for  
psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 383-451. 
 
Hey, J. D., 1991. Advances in behavioral economics. Journal of Economic Psychology, 12(4), 725-726. 
 
Hey, J. D. (2001). Does Repetition Improve Consistency? Experimental Economics, 4, 5–54. 
 
Hochman, G., Ayal, S., and Ariely D. (2014). Keeping your gains close but your money closer: The  
prepayment effect in riskless choices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 582–594. 
 
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V. L. (1996). Social distance and other-regarding behavior in  
dictator games. American Economic Review, 86, 653–660. 
 
Holt, C. A., and Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic Review,  
92(5), 1644-1655.  
 
Isaac, M., Walker J. M., and Thomas S. H. (1984). Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An  
Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations. Public Choice, 43, 113-149. 
104 
 
Isaac, M., McCue K., and Plott, C. (1982). Nash equilibrium in public goods provision: Free riding in  
experimentally controlled markets. California Institute of Technology Social Science Working 
Paper No. 428. 
 
Jago, A. G., and Vroom, V. H. (1982). Sex differences in the incidence and evaluation of participative   
leader behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 67, 776-783. 
 
Jamal, K., and Sunder, S. (1991). Money vs. gaming: Effects of salient monetary payments in double  
oral auctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 49, 151–166. 
 
Johnson, N.D. and Mislin, A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis, Journal of Economic  
Psychology, (32), 865–889 
 
Kagel, J. H., and Levin, D. (1986). The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value  
Auctions. American Economic Review, 76(5), 894-920. 
 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler R. H. (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect  
and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1325-1348. 
 
Kavanagh, M. J. (1975). Expected supervisory behavior, interpersonal trust and environment  
preferences: Some relationships based on a dyadic model of leadership. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 13, 17-30. 
 
Kim, O., and Walker, M. (1984). The free rider problem: Experimental evidence. Public Choice, 43(1),  
3-24.  
 
Klempt, C., and  Pull, K. (2009). Generosity, greed and gambling: What difference does symmetric 
information in bargaining make? Jena Economic Research Papers, 2009-021. 
 
Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior: A Meta-analysis of the Empirical  
Literature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 58–75. 
 
Ledyard, J. (1995). Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In J. Kagel & A. Roth (eds.) The  
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 111-194. 
 
Lipsey, R. (1979). An Introduction to Positive Economics, 5th edition, London: Weidenfeld and  
Nicholson. 
 
List, J. A. (2007). On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 
482-493. 
 
105 
 
Loewenstein G. (1999). Experimental economics from the viewpoint of behavioural economics.  
Symposium on ‘Experimental economics’ in Economic Journal, F25-F34. 
 
Marwell, G., and Ames, R. E., (1980). Experiments on the provision of public goods. II.  Provision  
points, stakes, experience and the free rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 85(4), 
926-937. 
 
Matthey, A., and Regner, T. (2013). On the independence of history: experience spill-overs  
between experiments. Theory and Decision,75, 403-419. 
 
McNemar, Q. (1946). Opinion-Attitude Methodology. Psychological Bulletin, 43, 289-374. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1836). On the Definition of Political Economy and the Method of Investigation Proper to It.  
In Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 4. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967, 
120-64.  
 
Moskowitz, H. (1971). Managers as partners in business decision research. Academy of Management  
Journal, 14, 317-325. 
 
Orne, M. T. (1969). Demand characteristics and the concept of quasi-controls. In R. Rosenthal, R.L.     
Rosnow (Eds.). Artifact in Behavior Research. Academic Press (1969), 147–181. 
 
Pelligra, V., and Stanca, L. (2013). To give or not to give? Equity, efficiency and altruistic behavior in  
an artefactual field experiment. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 46, 1-9. 
 
Peterson, R. A. (2001). On the Use of College Students in Social Science Research: Insights from  
a Second-Order Meta-Analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 28, 450-461. 
 
Plott, C. (1991). Will economics become an experimental science? Southern Economic Journal, 57(4),  
901-919. 
 
Plott, C. (1996). Rational individual behaviour in markets and social choice processes: the discovered  
preference hypothesis. In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (ed. K. J. Arrow, 
E. Colombatto, M. Perlam, and C. Schmidt). Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan. 
 
Regner, T., and Harth, N. S. (2010). Testing belief-dependant models. Jena Economic Research  
Papers, 2010-072. 
 
Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. MacMillan and  
CO., Limited St. Martin’s Street, London, 1945. 
 
Rosenthal, R. W., and Rosnow, R. L. (1969). Artifact in Behavioral Research. New York: Academic  
106 
 
Press. 
 
Rosnow, R. L. and Rosenthal, R. W. (1997). People studying people: artifacts and ethics in behavioral 
research.  New York: W.H. Freeman.  
 
Roth. A. E. (1986). Laboratory experimentation in economics. Economics and Philosophy, 2, 245-273. 
 
Roth. A. E. (1993). On The Early History of Experimental Economics. Journal of the History of  
Economic Thought, 15, 184-209. 
 
Roth. A. E. (1995) Introduction to experimental economics. In: The handbook of experimental  
economics, ed. J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth. Princeton University Press.  
 
Schneider, W. G. (1982). The effects of research complexity and tyre of subjects on the results of  
laboratory research in the field of union management relations. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. 
 
Schram, A. (2005). Artificiality: The tension between internal and external validity in economic 
experiments. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12, 225-237. 
 
Schultz, D. P. (1969). The Human Subject in Psychological Research. Psychological Bulletin, 72, 214- 
228. 
 
Sears, D. O. (1986). College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on  
Social Psychology’s View of Human Nature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  
51(9), 515-530. 
 
Seithe, M. (2012). Introducing the Bonn Experiment System.  
http://boxs.uni-bonn.de/boxs_seithe.pdf.  
 
Shapley H. (1964). Of Stars and Men. Boston. 
 
Siakantaris, N. (2000). Experimental economics under the microscope. Cambridge Journal of  
Economics, 23, 267-281. 
 
Smith, V. L. (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Economic Review  
Proceedings, 66, 274–279. 
 
Smith, V. L. (1982). Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. American Economic Review,  
72, 923-938. 
 
107 
 
Smith, V.L. (1991). Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. Journal of  
Political Economy,  99, 877–897. 
 
Smith, V. L. and Walker, J. M. (1993a). Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental  
economics. Economic Inquiry, 31, 245–261.  
 
Smith, V. L. and Walker, J. M. (1993b). Rewards, experience and decision costs in first price auctions.  
Economic Inquiry, 31, 237–245. 
 
Starmer, C. (1999). Experiments in economics: should we trust the dismal scientists in white coats?  
Journal of Economic Methodology, 6(1), 1-30. 
 
Stow, B. M., and Ross, J. (1980). Commitment in an experimenting society: A study of the attribution  
of leadership from administrative scenarios. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 249-260. 
 
Thaler, R. H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., and Schwartz, A. (1997). The Effect of Myopia and Loss  
Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 647- 
661. 
 
Thurstone, L.L. (1931). The Indifference Function. Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 139-167. 
 
Wallis, W. A. and Friedman M. (1942). The Empirical Derivation of Indifference Functions. In Studies  
in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in memory of Henry Schultz, O. Lange, F. 
McIntyre, and T.O. Yntema, editors, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 175-189. 
 
Xue, L., Sitzia, S. and Turocy, T. L. (2015). Mathematics self-confidence and the “prepayment effect”  
in riskless choices. https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/166500/0/CBESS+15-20.pdf/31995582-
7f0a-4ab6-bf72-7b53a9e6cab5 
 
Zizzo, D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. Experimental Economics,  
13(1), 75-9 
 
